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Patent Exclusions and Antitrust after Therasense 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Introduction 
In its Walker Process decision the Supreme Court held that one who obtained a 
patent by defrauding the patent office (PTO) and subsequently filed an infringement suit 
in order to exclude a rival, could violate the antitrust laws.1  In addition to the impropriety 
in obtaining the patent, the usual structural requirements for a monopolization or 
attempt to monopolize offense obtained as well.  That is, there must be either market 
dominance or a dangerous probability that the use of the suit would create it. 
Today, “fraud” on the PTO nearly always refers to inequitable conduct by the 
applicant during the patent application and prosecution process. But not every 
imperfection in a patent application process is sufficient to sustain an inequitable 
conduct charge or make a patent unenforceable. The Federal Circuit has set high 
standards for inequitable conduct, which require an actual intent to deceive the patent 
examiner, and a showing of “materiality.” The latter means that the examiner would very 
likely not have issued the patent or at least not approved certain claims had he or she 
known the truth. That court has also set high standards for establishing that a lawsuit on 
such a patent constitutes an antitrust violation.
2
  In its Therasense decision the Federal 
Circuit en banc raised the bar for inequitable conduct even further.
3
  The implications for 
finding antitrust violations based on improper patent infringement lawsuits remain to be 
seen. 
The inequitable conduct issue pertaining to the patent application process relates to 
but is not identical with the antitrust standard for filing improper infringement suits.  The 
term “inequitable conduct” is concerned with pre-grant conduct that occurs during the 
patent application and prosecution process, typically when the patent application makes 
an important omission or misrepresentation on the patent application or related 
disclosures.  By contrast, the antitrust violation most typically occurs at some later time, 
after the patent has issued, when the patentee or its assignee either files a patent 
infringement suit, threatens to file one, or perhaps takes some other kind of 
                                            
*
 Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.  Thank you to Rui Li for 
helpful research assistance. 
1
 Walker Process Equipment Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965). 
2
 See Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed.Cir.2007). 
3
 Therasense, inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  For good 
commentary on Therasense, see Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen and Ali Mojibi, The Federal 
Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: an Empirical Assessment, 84 S.Cal.L.Rev. ___ (2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686102; Jason Rantanen and 
Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First Impression (SSRN June 8, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1859764 (criticizing Therasense 
for going too far in limiting infringement defendant’s objections to a patent). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916074
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enforcement action such as notifying a rival’s customers that they are purchasing an 
infringing product.  As a result, there can be a significant difference in time between the 
two events.  Further, the requirement of bad faith in the application process differs in 
important ways from a bad faith requirement for filing an unmeritorious lawsuit. 
 Further, in its Therasense decision the Federal Circuit insisted that inequitable 
conduct be measured essentially by a subjective test.  Objective “reasonable person” 
tests such as negligence or even gross negligence will not suffice.  By contrast, the 
Supreme Court has insisted that the conduct giving rise to a wrongful infringement 
action for antitrust purposes be based initially on an objective test – whether a 
reasonable person knowing what he know would have brought this suit under these 
circumstances.
4
  If the plaintiff overcomes this hurdle, then it will be entitled to discovery 
as to the infringement plaintiff’s intentions. 
 
While Walker Process style antitrust claims are typically concerned with inequitable 
conduct, the improprieties qualifying as inequitable conduct is defined not by the 
antitrust laws but by the Patent Act, which sets forth the technical requirements for 
procuring a patent. Further, the ordinary Patent Act remedies inequitable conduct are 
substantial. These include, but are not necessarily limited to, invalidity or 
nonenforcement of the patent at issue.5 Indeed, “a finding of inequitable conduct in the 
acquisition of even a single claim of a patent renders the remaining claims of that patent 
unenforceable, even those without the taint of inequitable conduct.”6 If the fraud or 
misrepresentation occurs in an application for a reissue patent, even the original patent 
                                            
4
 See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
5
 See, e.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed.Cir.2007); Precision Instrument 
Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (barring enforcement of 
patent obtained by fraud); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1922) (inequitable conduct in patent application process yields 
nonenforceability of patent). See 35 U.S.C. §282. Further, if the inequitable conduct occurs with 
respect to any significant claim in the patent application, the entire patent becomes 
unenforceable. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
6
 Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., 417 F.3d 1369, 1374-1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
See also Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(en banc in pertinent part) (“When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct 
occurred in relation to one or more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire 
patent is rendered unenforceable.”).  A concurring opinion in Therasense suggested that a district 
court may choose to render fewer than all claims unenforceable, may simply dismiss the action 
before it, or may fashion some other reasonable remedy, so long as the remedy imposed by the 
court is “commensurate with the violation.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292.  He further explained 
that “a finding of inequitable conduct renders unenforceable all claims of the wrongly procured 
patent and, in certain circumstances, related patents, this singular remedy is neither compelled by 
statute, nor consistent with the equitable nature of the doctrine.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1299. 
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may become unenforceable,7 or misrepresentation respecting one patent may render 
related patents invalid and unenforceable as well.8 In addition, the government may sue 
to cancel a patent obtained by fraud,9 and judgments of invalidity for fraud or 
misrepresentation are generally given nonmutual collateral estoppel effect in 
subsequent actions brought by other licensees.10 A licensee under a patent determined 
to be unenforceable for fraud or inequitable conduct may escape payment of future 
royalties11 and, in cases of fraud, may recover previously paid royalties.12 Finally, the 
licensee or infringement defendant who proves fraud or inequitable conduct may 
                                            
7
 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1076 (1990). 
8
 Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933); Precision Instrument 
Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). See also Fox Indus v. Structural 
Preservation Sys., 922 F.2d 801, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“a breach of the duty of candor early in 
the prosecution may render unenforceable all claims which eventually issue from the same or a 
related application.”); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Intl. Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809-812 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (inequitable conduct in one application “permeated the prosecution” of related 
applications, rendering them unenforceable as well). But see Pharmacia Corp. v. Par 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 417 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (claims of inequitable conduct with respect 
to one patent did not serve to invalidate a different patent not acquired through inequitable 
conduct). 
9
 United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888). 
10
 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1970). On 
nonmutual, or “offensive,” collateral estoppel in antitrust cases, see 3 Antitrust Law ¶318. 
11
 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).  The unclean hands cases of Keystone, Hazel–
Atlas, and Precision formed the basis for a new doctrine of inequitable conduct that developed 
and evolved over time. Each of these unclean hands cases before the Supreme Court dealt with 
particularly egregious misconduct, incl uding perjury, the manufacture of false evidence, and the 
suppression of evidence. See Precision, 324 U.S. at 816–20,  Hazel–Atlas, 322 U.S. at 240; 
Keystone, 290 U.S. at 243. Moreover, they all involved “deliberately planned and carefully 
executed scheme[s] to defraud” not only the PTO but also the courts. Hazel–Atlas, 322 U.S. at 
245. As the inequitable conduct doctrine evolved from these unclean hands cases, it came to 
embrace a broader scope of misconduct, including not only egregious affirmative acts of 
misconduct intended to deceive both the PTO and the courts but also the mere nondisclosure of 
information to the PTO. Inequitable conduct also diverged from the doctrine of unclean hands by 
adopting a different and more potent remedy—unenforceability of the entire patent rather than 
mere dismissal of the instant suit. See Precision, 324 U.S. at 819 (dismissing suit); Hazel–Atlas, 
322 U.S. at 251 (noting that the remedy was limited to dismissal and did not render the patent 
unenforceable); Keystone, 290 U.S. at 247 (affirming dismissal of suit). See Therasense, 649 
F.3d at 1285. 
12
 USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 514 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 
694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983); Transitron Elect. Corp. v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co., 649 F.2d 871, 875-876 (1st Cir. 1981) (requiring knowing 
misrepresentation made to Patent Office at time of application). 
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receive Rule 11 sanctions or recover attorney's fees under the Patent Act itself.13 These 
remedies must be counted as significant, as intended by Congress to be appropriate to 
the harms in question, and to be the primary remedies for the injuries caused by 
improperly procured patents. 
Inequitable Conduct and Scope of Prior Art; Uncertainties Brought About 
by KSR Decision 
 In its KSR decision the Supreme Court tightened the standards for proving 
“nonobvious” subject matter, a statutory requirement of patentability inserted into the 
1952 Patent Act.
14
  Historically, patent applications were held to a mainly backward 
looking novelty, or anticipation, standard.
15
  The nonobviousness requirement is more 
forward looking, however, and asks whether the increment between the prior art and the 
claimed invention is sufficiently large that a person with ordinary skill in that art would 
not have anticipated it.
16
 
                                            
13
 See 35 U.S.C. §285 (permitting infringement defendant to recover attorney's fees from 
infringement plaintiff in exceptional circumstances). See Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp. (Fed. 
Cir. July 29, 2011), which administered sanctions, and observed that: 
 
Meritless cases like this one unnecessarily require the district court to engage in excessive 
claim construction analysis before it is able to see the lack of merit of the patentee’s infringement 
allegations….  In this case, Flagstar expended over $600,000 in attorney fees and costs to litigate 
this case through claim construction.   Supplemental Order on Fees and Costs.  Viewed against 
Eon-Net’s $25,000 to 75,000 settlement offer range,  it becomes apparent why the vast majority 
of those that Eon-Net accused of infringement chose to settle early in the litigation rather than 
expend the resources required to demonstrate to a court that the asserted patents are limited to 
processing information that originates from a hard copy document. Thus, those low settlement 
offers—less than ten percent of the cost that Flagstar expended to defend suit— effectively 
ensured that Eon-Net’s baseless infringement allegations remained unexposed, allowing Eon-Net 
to continue to collect additional nuisance value settlements. 
See also Evident Corp. v. Church Dwight, Inc., 399 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (approving 
recovery of attorney's fees by infringement defendant); Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. v. 
Acorn Mobility Services, Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (similar); Fox Indus. v. Structural 
Preservation Sys., 922 F.2d 801, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (similar); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. 
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969) (same). Contrast Lighting 
World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (not every case 
involving inequitable conduct is “exceptional,” justifying an attorney's fee award). 
14
 Ksr Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
15
 Although the Supreme Court began requiring a form of nonobviousness already in the mid-
nineteenth century.  See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850) (inventive step too 
small for doorknob whose only deviation from prior art was that it was made of clay rather than 
wood or metal).  See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN/& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, ch. 5 (2011); John Duffy,  
Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 Tex.L.Rev. 1 (2007) 
16
 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT, supra, chs. 4 & 5. 
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Even prior to KSR it was clear that “prior art” referred not merely to previous patents 
and patent applications, but to the full range of knowledge that might have anticipated 
the subject matter that the patent application claimed as something new.  KSR has 
additionally complicated this by adding a forward looking common sense requirement 
that requires even more inquiry into what is known in the industry.  These requirements 
can become particularly burdsome to the examination process when a patent involves a 
fairly recent market such as internet commerce, where old ideas are often transported 
into new situations.  For example, a patent for a particular process in internet 
purchasing may look novel if one limits the search to internet transacting, but they are in 
fact very old practices that have simply been transported from one environment to 
another.  For example, for a photographer accustomed to taking photographs of 
sporting events and offering them for sale, and then seeing how easily internet sales of 
all kinds of goods can be accomplished via websites such as Amazon.com or 
ebay.com, a process of posting and selling photographs on the internet hardly seems 
like something that a person with ordinary skill in the art would not be able to foresee.
17
 
But imposing additional obligations on the examiner necessarily imposes more 
obligation on the patentee, who is required to acknowledge known prior art on the 
patent applicant.  Within the time frame allotted to them a patent examiner can search 
prior documents in the patent office’s prior art database, but she cannot search the 
entire universe.  The patent applicant who has “borrowed” ideas from other fields of 
commerce has a special obligation to provide notice of prior art.
18
   Further, the less 
likely that the examiner will discover such art in a routine search, the greater the penalty 
for failure to disclose should be if the conduct is to be deterred.
19
 
 
Inequitable Conduct Before Therasense 
Inequitable conduct before the PTO requires a misrepresentation that was 
knowing,
20
 intentional, and material.
21
  Even prior to Therasense the Federal Circuit was 
                                            
17
 Ibid. 
18
See PTO, Manual of Patent Examing Procedure,  2141.01a, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htm: 
The examiner must determine what is "analogous prior art" for the purpose of analyzing the 
obviousness of the subject matter at issue. Under the correct analysis, any need or problem 
known in the field of endeavor at the time of the invention and addressed by the patent [or 
application at issue] can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed. 
 (citing KSR). Thus a reference in a field different from that of applicant's endeavor may be 
reasonably pertinent if it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would 
have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering his or her invention as a whole. 
19
 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
20
 See, e.g., Jersey Asparagus Farms, Inc. v. Rutgers Univ., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2011 WL 
2148631 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011) (rejecting Walker Process claim that failed to include allegation 
that patentee actually knew about alleged prior uses that would have barred the patent). 
21
 See Hovenkamp, Janis, Lemley, & Leslie, IP/Antitrust §2.2 (2d ed. 2011); and see Elk 
Corp. v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 168 F.3d 28, 30 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  See Kaiser Found. 
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Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2009), remanded, 2009 WL 
3877513 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2009) (patent applicant’s failure to disclose to PTO (a) a judicial 
decision that there had been prior sales that would have violated the on sale bar; and (b) an 
English translation of a Japanese document that revealed prior art could have amounted to fraud 
in procurement of the patent sufficient to support a later Walker Process claim); Fisher Tool Co., 
Inc. v. Gillet Outillage, 530 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (where patentee brought infringement suit 
and lost after narrow claim construction, infringement defendant brought antitrust claim and 
claim that marketplace assertions of infringement violated Section 43(a) unfair competition 
provision of Lanham Act; the court found that neither was brought in bad faith and patentee had 
“abundant” probable cause to bring patent infringement claim); ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. 
Canady Tech., LLC, 629 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (rejecting antitrust claim when infringement 
plaintiff’s suit was not objectively baseless even though patent had been found to be invalid); 
Rochester Drug Co-operative, Inc. v. Braintree Labs, 712 F. Supp. 2d 308 (D. Del. May 18, 
2010) (pioneer may have violated antitrust laws by listing invalid patent in Orange Book and 
then filing infringement actions against generics); Fresh Del Monte Pineapples Antitrust Litig., 
2010-2 Trade Cas. ¶77,220 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (antitrust defendant’s patent and trade 
secret litigation not a sham because it could have had a reasonable basis for thinking the claim to 
be valid). A later decision found no anticompetitive effect. Fresh Del Monte Pineapples Antitrust 
Litig., 2010-2 Trade Cas. ¶77,221 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2010). See also Carefusion Corp. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 2010-2 Trade Cas. ¶77,232 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) (defendant’s patent 
acquisitions public statements that it intended to enforce them not unlawful; no sham litigation 
directed at rivals); Wellbutrin SR Antitrust Litig., 2010-2 Trade Cas. ¶77,150, 2010 WL 3431707 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2010) (sustaining complaint that pioneer filed baseless suit even though at 
least one claim on one of two patents under suit was sustained; no requirement that entire lawsuit 
be a sham); LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asko Appliances, Inc., 2010-1 Trade Cas. ¶76,978, 2010 WL 
1377255 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2010, unpublished) (plaintiff adequately alleged monopolization by 
filing of infringement actions on fraudulently obtained patents where claim was specific as to 
relevant market and also the particulars of the alleged fraud, mainly failure to disclose four prior 
art references on patent application; that the omission was made with intent to deceive and 
material to granting of the patent); IGT v. Bally Gaming Intl., Inc., 2010-1 Trade Cas. ¶77,010, 
2010 WL 1727388 (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2010) (where patent infringement plaintiff had survived 
summary judgment motion and won partial judgment of validity and infringement, its 
infringement action could not be considered baseless); Somanetics Corp. v. CAS Medical Sys., 
Inc., 2010-1 Trade Cas. ¶77,032, 2010 WL 2178836 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 2010) (patentee who 
failed to disclose prior sales may have violated Sherman Act by filing infringement suit); Varian 
Semiconductor Equipment Assocs., Inc. v. Advanced Ion Beam Tech., Inc., 2009 WL 2425849, 
2009-2 Trade Cas. ¶76,714 (D. Mass. Aug. 4, 2009) (dismissing Walker Process action where 
counterclaimant failed to plead fraud with particularity and was ambiguous about its injury); 
Gabapentin Patent Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 340 (D.N.J. 2009) (refusing to dismiss generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s misuse and antitrust counterclaims against pioneer’s patent 
infringement suit, on theory that pioneer manipulated information and made exaggerated claims 
about its patents so as to delay launch of rival’s generic launch); Dicar, Inc. v. Stafford 
Corrugated Prods., Inc., 2009 WL 1796053, 2009-2 Trade Cas. ¶76,667 (D.N.J. June 22, 2009, 
unpublished) (refusing to dismiss Walker Process counterclaim for failure to allege injury to 
competition; counterclaimant adequately alleged relevant market and patentee’s market 
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dominance, and power to exclude competition; did not need to make additional allegation 
concerning impact on interbrand competition); Applera Corp. v. Mich. Diagnostics, 594 F. Supp. 
2d 150 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2009) (dismissing complaint that alleged that patentee’s application 
ignored prior art involving its rival’s co-founder dismissed because it did not identify which of 
many patents were obtained in this way, or which prior art was at issue; this failed to meet Rule 
9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements); Alternative Electrodes, LLC v. Empi, Inc., 597 F. 
Supp. 2d 322 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2009) (refusing to dismiss claim that rival was injured by sham 
patent infringement suits and false statements about patents to plaintiff’s customers; patent was 
allegedly invalid based on undisclosed prior art; sufficient that plaintiff alleged litigation costs as 
injury because the complaint also alleged that the conduct was having the effect of driving rivals 
out of the market); Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 2009 WL 678631, 2009-1 Trade Cas. ¶76,605 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2009) (refusing to dismiss complaint of conspiracy by manufacturer and 
distributor of pioneer drug to restrain generic competition through filing of baseless infringement 
claims and manipulation of FDA approval processes); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 
580 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2008) (pioneer drug manufacturer’s patent infringement 
litigation could have been a sham, given that claim construction was both “incorrect and 
untenable”); Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 2009 WL 1437815, 2009-1 Trade Cas. ¶76,630 
(D.N.J. May 19, 2009) (patent infringement suit not unlawful when there was not clear and 
convincing evidence of inequitable conduct before PTO, even though patent was declared invalid 
as obvious; ERBE Elecktromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech., LLC, 529 F. Supp. 2d 577 (W.D. Pa. 
2007) (patentee not shown to lack probable cause to bring mediation and infringement actions); 
OxyContin Antitrust Litig., 530 F. Supp. 2d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (insufficient evidence of 
inequitable conduct before PTO to support Walker Process style claim; while there were some 
omissions in patent application process, most were not material and there was no showing of bad 
faith); Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venall, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (sustaining 
complaint alleging infringement suit on fraudulently obtained patent, an 80 percent share of 
relevant market, and high entry barriers); Hertz Corp. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 557 F. Supp. 2d 
185 (D. Mass. 2008) (pre-issuance misconduct before PTO could be used just as much as post-
issuance misconduct to sustain Walker Process antitrust claim; plaintiff met heightened pleading 
requirements of FRCP 9(b) for showing fraudulent misstatements to PTO in patent application 
process). See also Garmin, Ltd. v. TomTom, Inc., 2007 WL 2903843, 2007-2 Trade Cas. ¶75,935 
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2007) (plaintiff adequately alleged Walker Process violation based on 
assertion of fraudulently acquired patents invalidated by prior art and patents that had already 
been invalidated by other federal courts; accepting allegation of relevant market of “portable 
handheld navigation devices sold in the United States”). See also SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelec., 
Inc., 2009 WL 1404689, 2009-1 Trade Cas. ¶76,625 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2009) (granting motion 
to bifurcate trial of inequitable conduct claim in patent infringement suit and antitrust 
counterclaim; a finding of no inequitable conduct could moot Walker Process suit, while a 
finding that inequitable conduct existed would still make a Walker Process suit necessary, given 
its more strenuous requirements).  See also AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 2010-1 Trade 
Cas. ¶77,034 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010) (pioneer drug patentee’s infringement suit against 
generic not objectively baseless even though pioneer ultimately lost; rejecting antitrust plaintiff’s 
claim that “automatic petitioning”—or the filing of claims indiscriminately against all entrants—
operated as an exception to Noerr even when the petitioning may not have been baseless in the 
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strict about all three requirements. For example, gross negligence was found insufficient 
to make out a claim of inequitable conduct on the issues of knowledge and intent.
22
  
Further, the infringement defendant or other person claiming inequitable conduct must 
plead it with “particularity,” meaning that it must provide specific facts about the nature 
of the claimed fraud or inequitable conduct.  This may include naming of the individuals 
who engaged in the conduct
23
 as well as specifics about the nature of the conduct, and 
which patent claims were affected by the conduct.
24
 
Inequitable conduct requires a “material” misrepresentation, which could mean a 
variety of things. A misrepresentation might be (1) an obvious and indisputable sine qua 
non for issuance of the patent, or (2) the critical factor in the mind of the patent 
examiner responsible for issuance of the patent, or (3) a factor that did in fact or would 
probably have influenced the examiner, or (4) a relevant and not unimportant factor in a 
judgment about patentability, or (5) a factor irrelevant to the issuance of the patent.
25
 
Which of these cases describes a “material” misrepresentation depends upon the 
reason for being concerned about “materiality.” If we are asking whether the patentee's 
                                                                                                                                            
particular case; court expresses some doubt that California Motor Transport’s “repetitive 
lawsuits” language remains viable after Professional Real Estate decision. 
And see DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 585 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3505 (2010) (assessing whether a claim of inequitable conduct contained the 
“something more” required by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 
F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007), discussed in the main text; refusing to dismiss at the pleading 
stage on this ground). On the “something more” required by Dippin’ Dots, see Christina 
Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 905 
(2010). 
Cf. Fiber Sys., Intl., Inc. v. Applied Optical Sys., Inc. 2009-2 Trade Cas. ¶76,827, 2009 WL 
3571350 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2009) (not permitting Walker Process claim to be joined with patent 
infringement claim at trial when combining the patent infringement issue and Walker Process 
issue might confuse the jury) 
22
 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en 
banc). 
23
 See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009), which 
rejected a complaint that the patentees “agents and/or attorneys” engaged in fraud but “fail[ed] to 
name the specific individual associated with the filing or prosectution of the application…. who 
knew the material information and deliverately withheld or misrepresented it.” 
24
 Id. at 1329 (“Second, the pleading fails to identify which claims, and which limitations in 
those claims, the withheld references are relevant to, and where in those references the material 
information is found – i.e., the ‘what’ and “’where’ of the material omissions.”) 
25
 But see Christopher Anthony Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Do 
Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the Presumption of Validity (SSRN, working 
paper, Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656568 
(empirical evidence suggesting that patent examiners d not pay a great deal of attention to 
applicant-submitted prior art references, but rather rely on their own research). 
Hovenkamp                                  Antitrust and Patent Exclusions After Therasense                  Dec. 2011, Page 9 
 
discovery is sufficiently useful, novel, and inventive (nonobvious)
26
 to warrant patent 
protection, the first case describes a representation that is material in the limited sense 
that its identification as false now settles the validity issue. In addition, the second case 
describes a misrepresentation that materially facilitated the issuance of the actual 
patent. To be sure, the patent might have been issued even without the 
misrepresentation if the examiner who thought the representation critical might have 
been overruled in the Patent Office or in the courts. Nevertheless, the applicant eased 
its way to a patent grant by the misrepresentation, which therefore contributed to its 
obtaining the legal power to exclude. The same is true in the third case, which 
dispenses with the need to decide long after the event what a particular patent examiner 
would have done in a hypothetical situation and in the light of a state of the art which 
may be quite different from that with which the examiner is currently working.
27
 The 
fourth case, as a practical matter, differs little from the third.  The fifth case, however, is 
qualitatively different.  If an omitted piece of prior art would have had no bearing on the 
decision to grant or deny a patent application, then it could not have been “material” to 
the grant decision. We would define “material” for antitrust purposes to include all of the 
first four cases, provided that one can tailor the definition of “wilfulness” to the 
importance of the misrepresented fact or, in the alternative, that one can adopt a fairly 
conservative definition of “wilfulness”—an issue to which we now turn. 
Defining “impropriety”; “willful” misrepresentation 
Prior to Therasence, an impropriety in patent procurement could render a patent 
unenforceable, but only a knowing or “wilful” misrepresentation would support the claim 
of a §2 violation, and in some cases even that may be insufficient.
28
  Therasence  
requires actual knowledge of a misrepresentation or omission and materiality for all 
cases finding inequitable conduct.  Of course, omissions falling short of inequitable 
conduct could still serve to make a patent unenforceable.  The antitrust standard need 
not be driven by the Patent Act standard.  That is to say, one might have situations in 
which an omission or misrepresentation in the patent process fell short of inequitable 
conduct but nevertheless rendered the patent unenforceable.  In such a case a 
subsequent infringement suit could constitute an antitrust violation. 
Materiality Measured by Objective Test 
                                            
26
 These are the basic criteria of patentability according to 35 U.S.C. §§101-103. When 
several applicants claim the same invention, relative priority will depend upon the dates of 
various experiments and constructions—matters peculiarly within the knowledge of each 
applicant. 
27
 In State of N.C. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.C. 1974) aff'd, 537 
F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1976),  the FTC determined that a misrepresentation was material on the basis 
of current testimony by an examiner about what he currently supposed he would have done had 
his question to the applicant been answered correctly. 
28
 E.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (knowing, intentional 
sworn statement about disqualifying prior sales insufficient when there was no collateral 
evidence of improper conduct) 
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Consider the patent applicant who, without “knowing” that the representation was 
false, made a misrepresentation about its own work that was decisive in the sense that 
the true facts would bar patentability. The “inventor” might have misread records, or 
“forgotten” some experiment or result, or failed to view a particular experiment with 
reasonable care, or poorly informed those who prepared the patent application and 
otherwise responded to the patent examiner.  Agency problems such as these are 
common, particularly in large firms where the correctness and completeness of a patent 
application depends on how fully and accurately information was communicated within 
the firm. In the case of the larger firm, it may be simply that necessary records were not 
examined or were destroyed before examination was possible. But the relevance of 
subjective ignorance is limited by objective considerations. 
Because subjective knowledge is so easy to disclaim and so hard to prove, legal 
institutions often rely on objective standards of knowledge. A misrepresentation could 
be considered knowingly made when a reasonable person in the applicant's position 
would have known it to be false, although in Therasense the Federal Circuit largely 
rejected that view.  Under an objective inquiry, the applicant who claims a failure of 
perception or recollection in using available information would be treated no more 
favorably than the reasonable person who would have known of the falsity. Where there 
are significant public implications, it is better to encourage reasonable care than to 
“reward” unreasonable ignorance. 
Accordingly, we would not totally excuse the representation whose falsity was not 
known to the applicant but that would have been known to a reasonable researcher who 
had exercised due care in conducting his or her experiment, in recording the results, or 
in communicating within the organization pursuing the patent. We do not suggest that 
the courts should substitute their judgment for that of the researchers, but fairly clear 
carelessness leading to an indisputably material misrepresentation should itself be 
grounds for finding an exclusionary act, at least for equitable antitrust purposes. In the 
absence of such clarity, the defendant is not likely to be liable, because its failure “does 
not rise to the level of unfair, bad faith dealing.”
29
 
                                            
29
 Compare the SCM dictum, SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), at 
448-449, that wilful misrepresentation is necessary to violate §2, although less clearly fraudulent 
behavior may constitute a misuse sufficient to make a patent unenforceable. We agree that the 
lesser behavior should not constitute a §2 violation for the purpose of the private treble damage 
claim involved in that case. 
The Federal Circuit appears to take a position that is somewhat more conservative than the 
one offered in the text, but the decisions seem to indicate that inequitable conduct will not be 
inferred from gross negligence alone, which means that it will not be inferred when the only 
evidence is that a significant omission is unexplained. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed.Cir. 2006): 
Gross negligence alone is insufficient to justify an inference of intent to deceive the PTO. In a 
case involving an omission of a material reference to the PTO, the record must contain clear and 
convincing evidence that the applicant made a deliberate decision to withhold a known material 
reference. 
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 Materiality, however, is a different matter.  Whether a misrepresentation or 
omission would have been material to a decision about patent issuance or scope 
depends largely upon the knowledge and perceptions of the examiner, not the 
applicant.  Further, the question is at least partially one of law to the extent it is driven 
by technical definitions of prior art.  Further, the subsequent query is not into the state of 
mind of a particular patent examiner, but rather a “reasonable” patent examiner looking 
at the patent application in question.  For example, an omitted prior art citation that is no 
more than cumulative of other citations that are themselves sufficient would not 
establish inequitable conduct.
30
  By contrast, a decisive item of prior art might have 
precluded patentability had the examiner known of it.
31
 
Prior to Therasense: balancing materiality and intent to deceive 
 Suppose that a patent applicant intentionally and knowingly omitted mentioning a 
particular piece of prior art on its patent application, but that it is somewhat doubtful that 
the patent examiner would have found this priot art decisive against the applicant.  Or at 
the other extreme, suppose that the applicant was negligent or even grossly negligent in 
omitting a piece of non-patent prior art that a patent examiner would have been unlikely 
to discover, but that if the examiner had known about this prior art the patent application 
clearly would would have been rejected.  Do both of these cases involve inequitable 
conduct?  Neither of them, because in each case one of the elements is too weak?  Or 
should the courts try to balance strong conduct showings against weak materiality 
showings, or vice-versa.  Prior to Therasense the courts generally balanced, or spoke of 
a “sliding scale” of conduct vs. materiality.
32
 
The argument against close appraisals of materiality depends in part on the degree 
                                                                                                                                            
See also M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (nondisclosure, accompanied by lack of any reasonable explanation, insufficient 
to create intent to deceive PTO; however, court went on to say that intent could be proven by 
“indirect” evidence when other evidence, in addition to nondisclosure alone, was present); 
Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (must consider 
evidence as a whole); Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988). And see 
Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bio-Technology, 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding 
inequitable conduct on the basis of objective evidence) 
30
 See Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1574-1575 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). 
31
E.g.,  Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 876 (1998). 
32
 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984) abrogated 
by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Before 
Therasense, a party alleging inequitable conduct had to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that (1) material information was not disclosed to the PTO, and (2) the non-disclosure was done 
with the intent to deceive the PTO. After Therasense, intent and materiality are separate 
requirements. 649 F.3d at 1290.  
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of a knowing misrepresentation. It would be easy if one could clearly define a sliding 
scale in which less proof of materiality would be required as the carelessness was 
greater, but that cannot be done.  For example, one could require “gross negligence” for 
anything other than misrepresentations vital to validity.  Prior to Therasence, Federal 
Circuit held that materiality and intent to deceive the PTO must be balanced against one 
another: as the evidence of intent to deceive is greater, the evidence of materiality can 
be less: 
A patent may be rendered unenforceable for inequitable conduct if 
an applicant, with intent to mislead or deceive the examiner, fails to 
disclose material information or submits materially false information 
to the PTO during prosecution. The party asserting inequitable 
conduct must prove a threshold level of materiality and intent by 
clear and convincing evidence. The court must then determine 
whether the questioned conduct amounts to inequitable conduct by 
balancing the levels of materiality and intent, “with a greater 
showing of one factor allowing a lesser showing of the other.”
33
 
Injury to competition is not and has never been a factor in the assessment of 
inequitable conduct, even though an invalid patent that creates or prolongs a monopoly 
is much more costly to society than one that is of negligible economic value. 
Accordingly, in situations where significant market power or a threat of monopoly is 
shown, we would permit a more relaxed set of requirements for inequitable conduct as 
an antitrust matter.34  While the issue of monopoly or dangerous probability of success 
in achieving it would not ordinarily arise in a case involving inequitable conduct alone, it 
would be part of a lawsuit that included a counterclaim for an antitrust violation.  The 
important factor is that the antitrust court need not be driven entirely by the definition of 
inequitable conduct in the patent sense, but only by the reasonableness of the 
infringement action or other exclusionary practice that occurred thereafter. 
Scope of Disclosure Duty; Lack of candor 
The existence and extent of any duty of affirmative disclosure is developed not only 
in reference to inequitable conduct, but also in the definition of antitrust claims and in 
the definition of the “misuse” that can deny the patentee its normal infringement 
                                            
33
 Digital Control, Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001); other citations omitted). See also Novo Nordisk Pharma., Inc. v. Bio-Technology 
Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d at 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“when balanced against high materiality, 
the showing of intent can be proportionally less,” quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Eli Lilly, Regents of the Univ. of 
California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (similar). 
34
 Cf. Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007) where the Federal Circuit 
required a higher standard for proving that a material misrepresentation constituted an antitrust 
violation. 
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remedies.
35
  The inquiries are not necessarily the same, because in a patent 
infringement suit the issue is what the patentee knew and should have disclosed at the 
time of a lawsuit, while the inequitable conduct inquiry focuses on pre-issuance conduct. 
The courts have often distinguished “less than candid disclosure” from “wilful 
misrepresentation,”
36
 but such a distinction is not fully consistent with the rationale for 
condemning affirmative misstatements. False statements subvert a government process 
depending heavily on the correctness of representations made by an applicant. Nor is 
there any offsetting social interest in protecting false statements or any solicitude for 
those who knowingly make them. These reasons apply with equal force to the 
nondisclosure of a fact that is known to be material in the sense that its disclosure 
would impede the issuance of a patent or preclude its subsequent enforcement. The 
nondisclosure of a clearly known fact that is clearly known to be material is 
indistinguishable from an affirmative misstatement of similar importance. The distinctive 
quality of nondisclosure, however, is the infinite universe of matters that might be 
known: it is obviously impossible for the applicant to know and disclose everything 
conceivably relevant to its application. 
What was known? 
As a legal term that which is “known” can have several meanings, ranging from 
subjective knowledge, to reason to know, to careless ignorance or indifference. A 
statement can be false yet innocent when the speaker did not know of the fact whose 
existence made the statement false. But once that fact is sufficiently known, the actor's 
moral dereliction is clear: everyone knows he should not lie, and the very making of the 
statement shows that the applicant understood it to be relevant.
37
 In the case of an 
applicant's failure to speak, however, condemnation depends on the tribunal's 
satisfaction that both the relevant fact and the fact of its relevance were known. These 
must be proved with clarity before the materiality inquiry becomes appropriate, and the 
courts seem to require this through their insistence upon a showing of willfulness.
38
 
Prior art representations 
Many although not all findings of inequitable conduct rest on failures to disclose prior 
art, in particular non-patent prior art that an examiner was not readily able to locate on 
her own.  The very act of applying for a patent is, in a sense, a representation that the 
claimed invention is a sufficient advance over the prior art to be entitled to patent 
protection.   A failure to cite prior art might occur because the applicant himself did not 
                                            
35
 On misuse, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT, ch.10. 
36
 E.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981). 
37
 E.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applicant obviously 
knew of some 800 prior sales that would have barred patentability but made sworn statement that 
no such sales had occurred; inequitable conduct sufficient to render patent unenforceable but not 
sufficient for Walker Process violation). 
38
 See Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 516 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Beckman Instruments v. Chemtronics, 428 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 
(1970). Both decisions involved failures to disclose prior art. 
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know about it and could not have discovered it even with a reasonable search.  
Howerver such an omission might be intentional, and the motive to fail to disclose is 
increased if the applicant believes that discovery would result in refusal to issue a 
patent or perhaps in the narrowing of its scope. 
At the same time, applicants do not necessarily or even usually tell all they know and 
believe to be relevant about the prior art. Such an “implied misrepresentation” or “lack of 
candor” differs from that concerning the applicant's own work in important respects. 
Published prior art, like the law, is as accessible to the Patent Office and third parties as 
it is to the applicant. The examiner does not in fact rely on an applicant's belief that it is 
entitled to a patent.  Rather, the PTO makes its own search and judgment about the 
prior art, and given the nature of the patentability issue, it would be unfair to put the 
applicant at his peril with respect to later judgments about what the applicant knew or 
should have known and considered relevant about the prior art. For these reasons, we 
would not think it wise to use antitrust doctrines to impose upon patent applicants any 
duty of general disclosure about the prior art beyond that which the patent system itself 
requires. However, applicants are properly charged under both patent and antitrust law 
to disclose prior public use or sale or other facts that they knew, and that would 
constitute a statutory bar.
39
  Further, those later filing infringement actions are 
responsible for making objective good faith judgments about the validity and 
enforceability of the right they are claiming. 
Inequitable Conduct Under Therasense 
In Therasense a divided en banc panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit tightened the standards for finding materiality and intent in resolving issues of 
inequitable conduct.
40
 Before Therasense, a party alleging inequitable conduct had to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) material information was not disclosed 
to the PTO, and (2) the non-disclosure was done with the intent to deceive the PTO.
41
 
Those two elements were then put on a sliding scale where a strong showing of one 
element, either materiality or intent, could override a weaker showing of the other.
42
  
However, because of concerns about the expansion of the use of an inequitable 
conduct allegation as a strategic tool, the Federal Circuit revisited and recrafted the 
requirements for a showing of inequitable conduct. The en banc court held that “the 
accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant knew 
of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold 
it.”
43
 The court also heightened the required showing for both materiality and intent to 
deceive, where a party alleging inequitable conduct must now show “but-for materiality” 
                                            
39
 See, e.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007); M. Eagles Tool 
Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Highway 
Equipment Co., Inc. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, 
Inc., 455 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
40
 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
41
Id. at 1287. 
42
Id. at 1288. 
43
Id. at 1290 (emphasis added). 
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and that the intent to deceive is “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn 
from the evidence.”
44
 In only one instance may the court find materiality without the 
requisite “but-for” causation, when “the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of 
egregious misconduct.”
45
  
Becton Dickinson sued Therasense and Abbott Laboratories (collectively “Abbott”) 
seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Abbott's patent for glucose blood 
test strips. Beyond arguing non-infringement, Becton Dickinson claimed that the patent 
in suit was void and unenforceable because of inequitable conduct committed during its 
prosecution. The actions alleged to constitute inequitable conduct arose from Abbott's 
prosecution of the patent in the United States and the position it took in that prosecution 
with respect to a prior patent prosecuted in Europe. The earlier European patent 
claimed another glucose test strip, preferably, it stated, with a membrane over the 
sensory electrode. When defending the instant patent in the United States, Abbott had 
to overcome an obviousness argument from the PTO which referenced the prior 
European patent. Abbott's attorney and the patent's inventor submitted affidavits to the 
PTO which stated that the previous patent only taught a glucose test strip with a 
membrane, while the instant patent specifically stated that a membrane was not used in 
the invention. However, in the earlier prosecution of the European patent, Abbott had 
argued that the European patent provided for a glucose test strip with or without a 
membrane. Abbott then did not disclose that previous position to the PTO in the 
prosecution of the new patent in the United States, an action Becton Dickinson claimed 
constituted inequitable conduct.   
A central issue during the examination that led to the issuance of the ′551 patent 
was whether the prior art had taught that glucose sensors could be used to test whole 
blood without a protective membrane.
46
 The examiner focused on whether the prior art 
′382 patent taught the use of sensors without membranes.
47
 On its face, the ′382 patent 
seemed to teach that sensors could be used without membranes when testing whole 
blood because the specification of the ′382 patent, when discussing the use of sensors 
with whole blood, stated the following: 
Optionally, but preferably when being used on live blood, a protective membrane 
surrounds both the enzyme and the mediator layers, permeable to water and 
glucose molecules. 
The district court found that the persons involved in prosecuting the ′551 application 
made representations to the examiner that the pertinent passage in the ′382 patent 
should not be taken at face value.
48
 In particular, the patentee’s expert submitted a 
declaration in which he stated that even though the ′ 382 patent referred to the use of a 
protective membrane surrounding the enzyme and mediator layers of the glucose meter 
as “optionally, but preferably” present, “one skilled in the art would have felt that an 
                                            
44
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
45Id. at 1292. 
46
Id. at 1317. 
47
Id. 
48
 Id. 
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active electrode comprising an enzyme and a mediator would require a protective 
membrane if it were to be used with a whole blood sample.”
49
 For that reason, he 
stated, he was “sure that one skilled in the art would not read [the ′382 patent] to teach 
that the use of a protective membrane with a whole blood sample is optionally or merely 
preferred.”
50
  The prosecuting attorney added his own remarks when submitting this  
declaration. He stated: “One skilled in the art would not have read the disclosure of the 
[′382 patent] as teaching that the use of a protective membrane with whole blood 
samples was optional. He would not, especially in view of the working examples, have 
read the optionally, but preferably language ... as a technical teaching but rather mere 
patent phraseology.” 
51
  The attorney added: “There is no teaching or suggestion of 
unprotected active electrodes for use with whole blood specimens in [the ′382] patent or 
the other prior art of record in this application.”
52
  Shortly after those submissions were 
made, the examiner allowed the claims for a membraneless sensor.
53
  
The district court found that Abbott had made directly contradictory representations 
to the European Patent Office (“EPO”) concerning the teaching of the ′382 patent in 
connection with the prosecution of a European patent application and had not disclosed 
those contradictory representations to the PTO.
54
 Before the EPO, Abbott represented 
that the European counterpart to the ′382 patent referred to a “protective membrane 
optionally utilized with the glucose sensor of the patent,” and that the membrane was 
“preferably to be used with in vivo measurements.”
55
 With specific reference to the 
language from the patent reciting the use of the protective membrane “optionally, but 
preferably when being used on live blood,” Abbott told the EPO: “It is submitted that this 
disclosure is unequivocally clear. The protective membrane is optional, however, it is 
preferred when used on live blood in order to prevent the larger constituents of the 
blood, in particular erythrocytes from interfering with the electrode sensor.”
56
  
The district court found that Abbott's representations to the EPO contradicted its 
representations to the PTO, made through the expert and the attorney.
57
 The district 
court also found that Abbott's failure to disclose to the examiner that it had made 
inconsistent statements to the EPO regarding the teaching of the ′382 patent was highly 
material.
58
 In particular, the court found that the failure to disclose the inconsistency in 
those statements was the kind of nondisclosure covered by PTO Rule 56, as being 
nondisclosure of information “inconsistent with a position the applicant takes in . . . 
[a]sserting an argument of patentability.”
59
  
                                            
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. at 1318. 
52
 Id. 
53 Id.  
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
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The district court found that Abbott's failure to disclose material information was 
intentional, i.e., it was made with the specific intent to deceive the PTO.
60
 The district 
court concluded that the patentee’s efforts to justify their conduct were unpersuasive.
61
 
The patentee’s representatives had been aware of the contrary representations made to 
the EPO and consciously chose to withhold them from the PTO.
62
 The court discredited 
their explanation that he understood the term “unequivocally clear” in the EPO 
submission to relate to the permeability of the membrane, not to the text immediately 
following the words “unequivocally clear,” where it is plainly stated that the membrane is 
optional.
63
 The court was not persuaded by their statement that he believed “optionally, 
but preferably” meant, in the context of patents, “optionally, but always.”
64
 
      
 The district court then considered possible alternative reasons for the decision not 
to disclose the contradictory EPO statements, such as the possibility that the applicant 
had misunderstood the meaning of the terms “whole blood” and “live blood.”
65
 
Ultimately, however, the district court could not identify any plausible reason for the 
nondisclosure and therefore found that the applicant had acted with deceptive intent.
66
  
 
As to the applicant’s later testimony that it believed that statements made to the PTO 
did not contradict the statements made to the EPO, the court found that the applicant 
knew that a representation had been made to the EPO that the ′326 patent did not 
require a membrane when used with whole blood.
67
 Noting that the applicant’s trial 
testimony had been impeached by his prior inconsistent statements on certain points, 
and finding that he exhibited an “unconvincing trial demeanor,” the district court found 
that he acted with the requisite intent to deceive.
68
  
 
In clarifying the standard applicable to claims of inequitable conduct, the court 
expressed how the doctrine has been “overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent 
suit, and is cluttering up the patent system.”69 The court reiterated that: 
 
[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has 
become an absolute plague. Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to make 
                                            
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. at 1319. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. at 1289 (quoting Kimberly–Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 
(Fed.Cir.1984)). 
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the charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to 
represent their client's interests adequately, perhaps.70  
The majority lamented that the “overplayed” “inequitable conduct doctrine has 
plagued not only the courts but also the entire patent system.”71 The majority opinion 
expressed its displeasure that the reduced standards for intent and materiality have 
become a significant litigation strategy, burdening courts, increasing the complexity, 
duration and cost of patent infringement, discouraging settlement, and deflecting 
attention from the merits of validity and infringement issues.72 The court commented, 
“[w]hile honesty at the PTO is essential, low standards for intent and materiality have 
inadvertently led to many unintended consequences, among them, increased 
adjudication costs and complexity, reduced likelihood of settlement, burdened courts, 
strained PTO resources, increased PTO backlog, and impaired patent quality.”73 The 
majority opinion then explained the proper standards: 
To pervail on a claim of inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must prove that 
the patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO. A finding that the 
misrepresentation or omission amounts to gross negligence or negligence under a 
“should have known” standard does not satisfy this intent requirement. In a case 
involving nondisclosure of information, clear and convincing evidence must show that 
the applicant made a deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference. In 
other words, the accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate 
decision to withhold it.74 
The majority opinion went on to explain that:  
Intent and materiality are separate requirements. A district court should not use a 
“sliding scale,” where a weak showing of intent may be found sufficient based on 
a strong showing of materiality, and vice versa. Moreover, a district court may not 
infer intent solely from materiality. Instead, a court must weigh the evidence of 
intent to deceive independent of its analysis of materiality. Proving that the 
applicant knew of a reference, should have known of its materiality, and decided 
not to submit it to the PTO does not prove specific intent to deceive. 
Because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare, a district court may infer 
intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence. However, to meet the clear and 
convincing evidence standard, the specific intent to deceive must be the single 
most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence. Indeed, the 
evidence must be sufficient to require a finding of deceitful intent in the light of all 
the circumstances. Hence, when there are multiple reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot be found. 
                                            
70
 Id. (quotingBurlington Indus.,Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418,1422 (Fed.Cir.1988)). 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. at 1288. 
73
 Id. at 1290. 
74
 Id. 
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… 
The absence of a good faith explanation for withholding a material reference 
does not, by itself, prove intent to deceive. 
… 
This court holds that, as a general matter, the materiality required to establish 
inequitable conduct is but-for materiality. When an applicant fails to disclose prior 
art to the PTO, that prior art is but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed 
a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art. Hence, in assessing the 
materiality of a withheld reference, the court must determine whether the PTO 
would have allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed reference. 
In making this patentability determination, the court should apply the 
preponderance of the evidence standard and give claims their broadest 
reasonable construction.
75
 
On the intent prong in particular, the Federal Circuit held that courts may infer intent 
from direct and circumstantial evidence, but that such intent must be “the single most 
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.”
76
 “When there are multiple 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot be found.”
77
  
For materiality, the court held that “the materiality required to establish inequitable 
conduct is but-for materiality.”
78
 Thus, the court must determine “whether the [PTO] 
would have allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed reference.”
79
 If the 
party challenging the patent shows each of these elements by clear and convincing 
evidence, the party defending the patent may offer a good faith defense.
80
  
The court did recognize one exception to the “but-for” causation required for 
materiality. When “the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of egregious 
misconduct,” materiality may be assumed.
81
 Willfully filing a false affidavit is an example 
of such egregious misconduct. The court made clear, however, that “mere 
nondisclosure of prior art references to the PTO [or] failure to mention prior art 
references in an affidavit” does not constitute affirmative egregious misconduct. Id. The 
Federal Circuit approved of the egregious misconduct exception because its roots are in 
the original “unclean hands” cases and it allows for flexibility when a willful fraud is 
perpetrated upon the PTO.
82
  
Although all 11 judges agreed that intent and materiality are separate 
                                            
75
 Id., at 1291-1292 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
76
 Id., at 1290 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
77
 Id., at 1290-1291. 
78
 Id., at 1291 (emphasis added). 
79
 Id.  
80
 Id. at 1292 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. 
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elements,
83
they also agreed that the former needs to be specific.
84
 But the Judges 
disagreed as to the proper test for materiality.
85
  
Because the district court applied the now-defunct standards of (1) materiality under 
PTO's Rule 56 and (2) intent based on the absence of a good-faith explanation, the 
court vacated those portions of its opinion and remanded for evaluation in light of the 
new standards. Judge O'Malley, while disagreeing with the majority's materiality 
standard, supported the decision to remand. The dissent, however, in an opinion 
authored by Judge Bryson, would have upheld the lower court's findings as to both 
materiality and intent, as it found the case “a compelling one for applying the principles 
of inequitable conduct.” 
86
 
Inequitable Conduct and Improper Infringement Actions 
Wrongfully brought infringement actions can be based on patents obtained by 
inequitable conduct.  In those cases the fraud or inequitable conduct in obtaining the 
patent generally suffices to establishe the impropriety of the subsequent infringement 
action.  One who acted fraudulently in obtaining a patent necessarily knows its patent is 
unenforceable.
87
 But infringement actions can also be qualifying exclusionary practices 
under §2 when they are based on valid patents that are known by the infringement 
                                            
83
 Id., at 1290 (majority opinion) [hereinafter majority] (“Intent and materiality are separate 
requirements.”); Id., at 1297 (O'Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  (“[I]ntent 
to deceive and materiality must be found separately.”); Id., at 1304 (Bryson, J., dissenting) 
[hereinafter dissent] (“Intent to mislead and materiality must be separately proved.”). 
84
 Id., at 1290 (majority) (“[T]he accused infringer must prove that the patentee acted with 
the specific intent to deceive the PTO.”); Id., at 1297 (concurrence) (“[A] district court must find 
that the conduct at issue is of sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive”) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Id., at 1304 (dissent) (“Inequitable conduct 
requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that the applicant or attorney intended to 
mislead the PTO with respect to a material matter.”). 
85 Id., at 1291 (majority) (“[T]he materiality required to establish inequitable conduct is but-
for materiality.”); Id., at 1300 (concurrence) (laying out three instances in which “conduct should 
be deemed material . . . .”); Id., at 1305 (“[T]he ‘but for’ standard for materiality is too restrictive 
to serve the purposes that the doctrine of inequitable conduct was designed to promote.”). 
86 Id., at 1319. 
87
 See 3 Antitrust Law ¶705. Of course, principles of res judicata apply. See Abbott 
Laboratories v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2007-1 Trade Cas. ¶75,617 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 
2007) (infringement defendant/counterclaimant adequately alleged Walker Process violation; 
while the court could take judicial notice of another decision finding that patentee had not 
engaged in inequitable conduct before PTO [Abbott v. Torpharm, 2006 WL 2458717 (N.D. Ill. 
2004)], Mylan was not a party to that litigation, and thus the facts found there were not 
dispositive as to it; citing GE Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (a court “cannot achieve through judicial notice what it cannot achieve through 
collateral estoppel” when the plaintiff in a subsequent action was not a party to the previous 
action and “has never been afforded an opportunity to present its evidence and arguments on the 
claim”)) 
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plaintiff to be unenforceable as a result of other defects, or even on valid patents but 
where the infringement plaintiff knew or should have known that the infringement 
defendant was not an infringer.
88
 Wrongfulness can also be established when the 
infringement plaintiff bases its cause of action on unreasonable and clearly incorrect 
interpretations of questions of law. For example, an action for contributory infringement 
is proper against one who sells a nonstaple good under circumstances where the buyer 
of the good must infringe the patent in order to make use of the good.
89
 But an action 
against the manufacturer of a staple good with numerous noninfringing uses would be 
clearly contrary to law and thus presumably brought in bad faith.
90
 
The important difference between infringement actions based on fraudulently 
procured patents and other improper infringement actions is that for the latter the 
conduct in obtaining the patent does not in and of itself establish impropriety.  Rather 
the antitrust plaintiff must establish that the enforcer knew or should have known at the 
time of bringing the suit that the patent was unenforceable under the circumstances in 
question. Nevertheless, this difference is readily exaggerated. The all-important 
question in either circumstance is whether the patentee has (1) committed an 
exclusionary act that is (2) not authorized by the patent law. 
The exclusionary act is most generally a patent infringement suit, or in some cases 
another assertion of the patent's exclusionary power. As a result, the wrongfulness of 
the act must be assessed as of the time it is asserted. As a general proposition, merely 
obtaining a patent by fraud with no subsequent enforcement attempt, is not an 
exclusionary practice under §2.
91
 Once the infringement action is filed, the relevant 
question becomes whether the infringement plaintiff knew or should have known that 
the action is improper, and this can result from any deficiency, including but not limited 
to fraud or inequitable conduct before the PTO. 
Typically, but not always, the antitrust claim is a compulsory counterclaim to the 
                                            
88
 See, e.g., United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd, 
343 U.S. 444 (1952) (lawsuits on machine alleged to infringe but that patentee had never 
examined); Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. International Nutrition Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 296, 313-314 
(D. Conn. 2001) (antitrust claim survived motion to dismiss where it alleged that defendant's 
prior patent infringement action was objectively baseless because it did not reasonably have 
ownership of the patent in question). Suits for contributory infringement against those making 
products complementary to the patented product could also qualify as exclusionary practices. 
Such suits are authorized in 35 U.S.C. §271(d); §271(c) of that statute defines “contributory 
infringement.” 
89
 For the definition of “contributory infringement” and further explanation, see 10 Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶1781b (3d ed. 2011). 
90
 See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980); and 35 U.S.C. 
§271(c), whose provision on contributory infringement expressly excludes “a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use….” 
91
 See 3 Antitrust ¶705e; and Cygnus Therapeutic Systems v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). On the possibility of a proceeding under the FTC Act, see 3 Antitrust Law 
¶705c. 
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underlying infringement suit.
92
 First, the patentee files its infringement action. Then the 
infringement defendant
93
 answers that the asserted patent is invalid or unenforceable 
under the circumstances or that the infringement defendant's technology does not 
infringe. In addition, the infringement defendant counterclaims, alleging that the 
unwarranted infringement action is itself monopolization or an attempt to monopolize a 
market covered by or related to the patent in question. 
In Nobelpharma
94
 the Federal Circuit explored the relationship between the 
Supreme Court's Professional Real Estate (PRE) decision
95
 and its earlier Walker 
Process conclusion
96
 that obtaining a patent by fraud and then attempting to enforce it 
could constitute an antitrust violation. The infringement plaintiff had filed suit on a patent 
that was found to be invalid for failure to disclose the best mode for carrying out an 
invention. The main purpose of this requirement is to permit those examining the patent 
to learn the best mode for applying the invention without undue experimentation, thus 
facilitating the entry of the innovation into the public domain once the patent expires. In 
this case the Swedish patentee had additional information about the best mode for 
carrying out its invention, but that information was not disclosed and did not appear in 
the application for a United States patent. The jury concluded from this evidence that 
the patent had been obtained by fraud.
97
 
The court indicated that antitrust liability for an improperly brought patent 
infringement suit can be established by one of two alternative routes: 
A patentee who brings an infringement suit may be subject to 
antitrust liability for the anti-competitive effects of that suit if the 
alleged infringer (the antitrust plaintiff) proves (1) that the asserted 
patent was obtained through knowing and willful fraud within the 
meaning of Walker Process…, or (2) that the infringement suit was 
“a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor….”
98
 
                                            
92
 See 3 Antitrust Law ¶705e. 
93
 To simplify the exposition, we use the terms “infringement plaintiff” and “infringement 
defendant” to refer to the original parties to an infringement action; and “antitrust plaintiff” and 
“antitrust defendant” to refer to the parties with respect to the antitrust countersuit. 
94
 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
876 (1998) (vacating and withdrawing the previous panel opinion published at 129 F.3d 1463 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). 
95
 See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 
(1993) (PRE); see also 1 Antitrust Law ¶205b. 
96
 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
97
 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1062. 
98
 Id. at 1068, citing Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127, 144 (1961), and California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 
510 (1972); on the “sham” exception for badly founded litigation, see 1 Antitrust Law ¶¶204-
208. 
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The court then noted Justice Harlan's Walker Process concurrence seeking to 
distinguish patents obtained by deliberate fraud from patents “rendered invalid or 
unenforceable for other reasons….”
99
 He feared that permitting private antitrust 
challenges to 
also reach monopolies practiced under patents that for one reason 
or another may turn out to be voidable under one or more of the 
numerous technicalities attending the issuance of a patent, might 
well chill the disclosure of inventions through the obtaining of a 
patent because of fear of the vexations or punitive consequences of 
treble-damage suits. 
The Federal Circuit then observed that: 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Walker Process, 
as well as Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, we have 
distinguished “inequitable conduct” from Walker Process fraud, 
noting that inequitable conduct is a broader, more inclusive concept 
than the common law fraud needed to support a Walker Process 
counterclaim.
100
 
“Fraud” was then defined the in the common law sense as: 
(1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that 
representation, (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of mind 
so reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be the 
equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a justifiable reliance upon the 
misrepresentation by the party deceived which induces him to act 
thereon, and (5) injury to the party deceived as a result of his 
reliance on the misrepresentation.
101
  
Clearly, a patent might be invalid or unenforceable for reasons falling short of fraud 
in the common law sense. Further, an infringement action might be improper even 
though the patent is valid—such as, for example, when the patentee knows that the 
infringement defendant's technology does not infringe because none of the claims in the 
                                            
99
 Nobelpharma, 41 F.3d at 1069, quoting, Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & 
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 179-180 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
100
 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069. See also DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 
2007-1 Trade Cas. ¶75,726 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) (mere inequitable conduct as opposed to 
fraud before PTO insufficient to create Walker Process claim on part of purchasers).  Accord 
Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
101
 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069-1070. See also Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift–
Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1358 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev'd on non-antitrust grounds, 546 U.S. 
394 (2006) (repeating these requirements; ultimately rejecting antitrust claim for failure to show 
relevant market; on intent, the court stated that “a state of mind so reckless as to the 
consequences that it is held to be the equivalent of intent” will suffice to show fraud). 
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asserted patent cover it.
102
 
The court then addressed an issue left undecided by the Supreme Court in its PRE 
decision
103
—namely, how “Noerr applies to the ex parte application process,” and, 
particularly, “how it applies to the Walker Process claim.”
104
 The Federal Circuit itself 
had twice refused to resolve this issue.
105
 The court then concluded: 
PRE and Walker Process provide alternative legal grounds on 
which a patentee may be stripped of its immunity from the antitrust 
laws; both legal theories may be applied to the same conduct. 
Moreover, we need not find a way to merge these decisions. Each 
provides its own basis for depriving a patent owner of immunity 
from the antitrust laws; either or both may be applicable to a 
particular party's conduct in obtaining and enforcing a patent. The 
Supreme Court saw no need to merge these separate lines of 
cases and neither do we.
106
 
First, the court held, if the fraud elements of the Walker Process claim could be 
made out, as well as the “other criteria” for antitrust liability,
107
 “such liability can be 
imposed without the additional sham inquiry required under PRE.”
108
 That is, assuming 
the patent was procured by fraud and the other elements of an antitrust claim were met, 
an infringement suit based on that patent encountered automatic antitrust liability. 
By contrast, 
irrespective of the patent applicant's conduct before the PTO, an 
antitrust claim can also be based on a PRE allegation that a suit is 
baseless; in order to prove that a suit was within Noerr's “sham” 
exception to immunity, an antitrust plaintiff must prove that the suit 
was both objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by a 
desire to impose collateral, anti-competitive injury rather than to 
                                            
102
 In the copyright context, see Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) where the validity of the infringement plaintiff's copyright was 
not in dispute; rather, the antitrust counterclaim was based on the legal theory that the 
compensated playing of a videodisc in a hotel room was not an infringement of the copyright. 
103
 See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 
(1993). 
104
 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071, quoting district court opinion, 930 F. Supp. at 1253, 
which was in turn referring to Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
508 U.S. at 61 n.6. 
105
 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071, citing FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931, 939 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 814 (1996); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. 
Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1583 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
106
 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. 
107
 On these other requirements, see 1 Antitrust Law ¶208 (“sham” filings constitute only the 
conduct element of antitrust offense). 
108
 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. 
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obtain a justifiable legal remedy.
109
 
As the court explained: 
Thus, under PRE, a sham suit must be both subjectively brought in 
bad faith and based on a theory of either infringement or validity 
that is objectively baseless. Accordingly, if a suit is not objectively 
baseless, an antitrust defendant's subjective motivation is 
immaterial. In contrast with a Walker Process claim, a patentee's 
activities in procuring the patent are not necessarily at issue. It is 
the bringing of the lawsuit that is subjectively and objectively 
baseless that must be proved.
110
 
In sum, in the Federal Circuit's conception, the “bringing of the lawsuit” was the 
relevant antitrust act for a PRE-style claim, while it was the patentee's actions in 
procuring its patent that were relevant to the Walker Process antitrust claim. To us, the 
two actions do not differ all that much, and the “bringing of the lawsuit” or similar 
exclusionary activity is in fact the gravamen of both offenses.  That is, the antitrust claim 
must be tested by the conduct that is most relevant to antitrust, which is the bringing of 
the infringement claim or other post-issuance enforcement conduct. 
In Nobelpharma the court found substantial evidence from which a jury could have 
reached factual conclusions that would “strip NP [the infringement plaintiff] of its 
immunity from antitrust liability.”
111
 This evidence indicated that the patentee had 
fraudulently failed to disclose information to the PTO that would have prevented the 
patent from being issued. Evidence in the record supported a finding of Walker Process 
fraud on all of the elements listed above. Further, there was evidence that the defendant 
brought its infringement suit with knowledge that the patent application had been 
fraudulent.
112
 
Nevertheless, the distinctions between Walker Process antitrust liability and liability 
for “sham” infringement litigation are somewhat elusive. First, while Walker Process 
itself spoke as if “obtaining” a patent by fraud was the gravamen of the antitrust 
defense,
113
 the actual facts were that the patent holder was bringing an infringement 
action. Simply obtaining a patent fraudulently with no subsequent enforcement activity 
does not violate the Sherman Act, although it may violate the FTC Act.
114
 Of course, 
                                            
109
 Id. at 1071, citing PRE, 508 U.S. at 60-61. 
110
 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072. 
111
 Id. at 1073. 
112
 Id. at 1072. 
113
 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. at 174, 
sustaining an amended counterclaim alleging that the antitrust defendant “illegally monopolized 
interstate and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining…its 
patent…well knowing that it had no basis for…a patent….” 
114
 See 3 Antitrust Law ¶705a-b; on FTC §5 liability, see 3 Antitrust Law ¶705c. The Federal 
Circuit recognizes this proposition. See Cygnus case, In re Cygnus Telecommunications Tech., 
LLC, Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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one might enforce a fraudulently obtained patent in other ways than by making or 
threatening infringement actions. For example, one might simply assert the patent and 
warn a potential rival to stay out of the market the patent assertedly covers; or one 
might insist on collecting a royalty for technology allegedly covered by such a patent. 
Clearly a patent obtained by fraud could be used in an anticompetitive way falling short 
of an infringement suit. Whether such practices are sufficiently exclusionary so as to 
violate the antitrust laws cannot be stated categorically. 
Second, once an infringement action is brought or threatened
115
 then the “sham” 
issue is addressed first by considering whether the lawsuit is objectively baseless.
116
 A 
large number of defects could render a lawsuit objectively baseless, including but not 
limited to these: (1) the patent may have been procured by fraud in the Walker Process 
sense, and thus be invalid and unenforceable;
117
 (2) the patent may be rendered 
unenforceable by inequitable conduct before the PTO or by other knowledge or 
activities falling short of fraud; (3) The patent may have expired;
118
 (4) the patent may 
be valid and enforceable, but the infringement plaintiff may know or should have known 
that the infringement defendant's technology does not infringe the patent, perhaps 
because the asserted claim construction was unreasonable;
119
 (5) the infringement 
defendant's actions may be lawful as a result of a previously granted license;
120
 (6) 
there may be a legal or jurisdictional rule that makes the infringement suit improper as a 
                                            
115
 On Noerr protection for threatened litigation, provided it is not a sham, see 3 Antitrust 
Law ¶205e. See also Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 84 Ind. L.J. (2008) (advocating 
antitrust remedy). 
116
 See 1 Antitrust Law ¶205b. 
117
 Cf. Open LCR.Com, Inc. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (D. Colo. 2000) 
(plaintiff's allegations that patentee failed to disclose prior art to PTO and then threatened and 
brought infringement claims without realistic expectation of success on merits even after 
antitrust plaintiff documented the existence of the prior art were sufficient to support antitrust 
action). 
118
 See International Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Pilkington PLC, 137 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 
1998) (infringement suit based on expired patents a possible antitrust violation). 
119
 Cf. Besser v. Walsh, 601 F.3d 163 cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 342 ( 2010) and vacated in part 
on reh'g en banc sub nom. Portalatin v. Graham, 624 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1691 (2011) (infringement plaintiff did not have good reason to believe that infringement 
defendant's technology infringed); Moore USA, Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 
348 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to dismiss Sherman §2 counterclaim allegation that patentee 
filed infringement claim while knowing that counterclaimant's product did not infringe because it 
did not incorporate an essential ingredient); Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1155 
(D. Colo. 2000) (for purposes of filing antitrust claim, infringement defendant was entitled to 
discovery of factual basis for infringement plaintiff's allegations that former's technology 
infringed the latter's patent). 
120
 Cf. Glass Equip. Dev. v. Besten, 174 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (patentee sued for 
infringement; alleged infringer claimed it had an implied license to use the patented technology 
and filed antitrust counterclaim; court finds no implied license, which entails that infringement 
claim was well founded; thus no antitrust violation). 
Hovenkamp                                  Antitrust and Patent Exclusions After Therasense                  Dec. 2011, Page 27 
 
matter of law.
121
 
Third, the Nobelpharma decision concluded that if the infringement defendant 
(antitrust plaintiff) shows that a patent was obtained by fraud, then the 
unreasonableness of the infringement suit has automatically been established. As a 
result no additional jury instructions under PRE or Noerr are required.
122
 The court did 
not indicate what these instructions would have been, but apparently they would have 
advised the jury that the right to bring an infringement suit is broad and cannot be 
limited except for a proven sham. But in that case the difference between a Walker 
Process fraud case and a PRE-style infringement action is small and revolves only 
around the necessity of bringing an additional jury instruction that, while unnecessary in 
the first, would have been advisable in any event, given that the jury might have failed to 
find fraud but might have found other conduct rendering the lawsuit a sham. 
The Nobelpharma decision thus seems to exaggerate the difference between 
situations in which an infringement action is unwarranted because the patent was 
obtained by fraud and those where the action is unwarranted as a result of other defects 
that the infringement plaintiff clearly knew or (measured objectively) should have known.  
For antitrust purposes, the all-important question in both is whether a reasonable actor 
in the infringement plaintiff's position should have known at the time of the lawsuit that 
the infringement action or other exclusionary conduct was legally inappropriate under 
the circumstances. Fraud in obtaining a patent is only one of many circumstances 
rendering the infringement action inappropriate.
123
 
                                            
121
 Cf. PRE, Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 
113 S. Ct. 1920, 123 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1993) (copyright infringement action not improperly brought 
where circuits were divided on a dispositive question of law and one had sided with the 
infringement plaintiff's position); Mitek Surg. Prods., Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 230 F.3d 1383, 2000 
WL 217637, 2000-1 Trade Cas. ¶72,803 (Fed. Cir. 2000, unpub.) (two different district courts 
had disagreed on claim construction of patent subject to infringement action; patentee entitled to 
bring infringement action relying on the favorable district court holding). As a general matter, 
claim construction presents a question of law. See also Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 
U.S. 370 (1996); IMS Tech., Inc. v. Hass Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2000), 
cert. dismissed, 530 U.S. 1299 (2000); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). A lawsuit in one court based on a claim construction broader than that given in one or 
more other courts raises issues analogous to those in PRE. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. 
Janis, Mark A. Lemley, & Christopher R. Leslie, Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law §2.2c 
(2d. ed. 2010 & Supp.). Cf. Goss Intl. Americas, Inc. v. MAN Roland, Inc., 2007-1 Trade Cas. 
¶75,632 (D.N.H. Mar. 12, 2007) (denying Walker Process claim based on alleged inequitable 
conduct in procurement of a different patent than the one being enforced when it could not be 
shown that inequitable conduct in procurement of one patent would have invalidated the second 
patent). 
122
 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
123
 Consider the Supreme Court's decision in KSR Intl. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 
(2007), which changed the patentability standard of obviousness, holding that the Federal Circuit 
had not been sufficiently strict in cases where someone reasonably skilled in the art could have 
anticipated the patent claim, even in a different field. At this writing it is too early to assess the 
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Further, while failing to require the Noerr/PRE instruction may have been harmless 
error in the case at hand, that would not always be so. First, if the jury found no fraud 
but found other reasons why the suit should not have been brought, failure to give the 
instruction might require a new trial. In such a case there must be a conclusion that the 
lawsuit was objectively baseless, and this question could be one of fact, depending on 
the circumstances. Second, there may be situations in which even an infringement 
lawsuit based on a fraudulently procured patent could not be the basis of an antitrust 
counterclaim. Consider, for example, the patentee who obtains its patent by fraud and 
then transfers it or gives an exclusive license to an innocent acquirer. The acquirer, not 
knowing of the fraud, believes its enforcement right to be valid and brings an 
infringement suit. In such a case it would be the infringement plaintiff's actual or 
objective knowledge at the time of the infringement suit that would establish its antitrust 
culpability. 
Whatever the limits on unfounded suits generally, the monopolist burdening a rival 
with a bad faith suit clearly commits an exclusionary act. At the same time, however, 
even the monopolist is entitled to protect its property rights. Too expansive a conception 
of baselessness could turn many infringement actions into antitrust claims against the 
infringement plaintiff, thus putting the patent owner at peril even in defending its own 
property rights.
124
 
As noted before, some cases do not involve a filed infringement action at all; they 
involve only a threat to sue or communications to customers.
125
 For example, consider 
the monopolist who—knowing its patent to be invalid—writes a letter to a rival's 
customers threatening infringement actions if they continue buying from the rival.
i
 The 
customers are very likely in an even poorer position than the rival to know about the 
patent's invalidity. Further, the cost to a customer of switching its patronage may be far 
lower than the cost to the rival of defending any infringement action. Indeed, acting with 
uncertainty, the customers may switch rather than accept any apparent risk of litigating 
a costly infringement suit.
126
 
                                                                                                                                            
impact of KSR on antitrust challenges to infringement actions. Quite possibly, however, a certain 
class of patents previously thought valid will now be invalid under the KSR standard. One who 
brought suit on such a patent knowing of the almost certain invalidity might reasonably be 
subjected to an antitrust counterclaim. This would be an example of a change in a rule of law that 
subsequently rendered a certain class of patents invalid. 
124
 Antitrust's Noerr doctrine generally deals with these issues. See Ch. 2A. 
125
 See 1 Antitrust Law ¶205e; and Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 
(Fed.Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 815 (1998) ("The antitrust laws do not preclude patentees 
from putting suspected infringers on notice of suspected infringement). 
126
 See Goss Intl. Americas, Inc. v. MAN Roland, Inc., 2006 WL 1575287, 2006-2 Trade Cas. 
¶75,392 (D.N.H. June 2, 2006) (Walker Process claim did not require that owner of fraudulently 
obtained patent actually file patent infringement suit; warning letters or other threats based on 
such a patent could suffice; relying on Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 
1341, 1344-1345, 1357-1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev'd in part on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 
(2006). 
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Inequitable Conduct and Antitrust Liability: Principal Distinction Temporal 
 
The principal distinction between Therasense and Walker Process remains 
temporal, and this can cut in both directions.  In general, inequitable conduct refers to 
actions and state of mind (under Therasense) that occur during the patent prosecution 
process.  By contrast, Walker Process refers to actions and state of mind at the time a 
patent infringement action is filed, which can be many years after issuance (roughly 12 
years, for example, in Dippin’ Dots).127  This has several implications. 
First, there could be inequitable conduct under Therasense but relative innocence at 
the time of an infringement suit if (a) the patent has been assigned to an innocent 
recipient; or (b) the persons within the firm who were guilty of the inequitable conduct 
are no longer available and the persons who file the infringement suit are unsuspecting. 
  This is highly likely to be true for firms with thousands of patents, because the kinds of 
things that would yield inequitable conduct are often not disclosed on the record, given 
that they tend to be omissions. One conceptual difficulty of Therasense  is that state of 
mind refers to persons, but large firms have many persons.  Further, those filing an 
infringement suit on a ten year old patent have little incentive to dig too deeply in order 
to find out whether now departed patent prosecutors engaged in equitable conduct. 
Second, a patent might have been obtained without inequitable conduct, but 
subsequent evidence of prior art or barring sales or use might emerge, and the person 
filing the infringement action might have knowledge of these things.  In that case a 
Walker Process action should be permitted even though the person prosecuting the 
patent was innocent of inequitable conduct as Therasense defines it. 
For Antitrust Purposes Baseless Enforcement Action Measured Initially by 
Objective Standard 
Infringement claims can range from a bad faith suit actually known by its plaintiff to 
be groundless, to a “carelessly” brought action, to a reasonable but uncertain suit, or to 
one that is both sure and actually successful. Often reliable evidence about the 
infringement plaintiff's subjective mental state will be unavailable. In any event, in the 
case of valid claims, mental state is irrelevant, for the patentee, just like any other 
property owner, can enforce its rights no matter what its intent.
128
 
In any event, objective evidence about what is reasonable under the circumstances 
                                            
127
 Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed.Cir.2007). 
128
 See, e.g., Independent Service Org. (ISO) Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001) (since validity of Xerox's patents had not been disputed, the 
attempt to enforce them via an infringement counterclaim could not be baseless). 
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often provides a basis for determining the reasonableness of the infringement claim. 
Requiring objective baselessness also encourages reasonable care in subjecting rivals 
to the burdens of an infringement action. Accordingly, a monopolist's careless 
challenges made without adequate inquiry into underlying facts or law should also be 
regarded as improper. 
In Professional Real Estate (PRE), the Supreme Court held that a copyright (not 
patent) infringement suit is immune from antitrust challenge unless it is baseless, with 
baselessness measured by an objective standard.
129
 Significantly, the “baselessness” 
question in PRE referred entirely to the reasonableness of the infringement plaintiff's 
interpretation of the federal copyright statute as a matter of law. The decision expressly 
deferred the question of antitrust immunity if the infringement plaintiff engaged in “fraud 
or other misrepresentations” of fact.
130
 
The relevant points respecting PRE are these: 
(1) If the disputed question in the patent infringement suit is entirely a question of 
law—such as, for example, whether the infringement plaintiff's interpretation of a 
particular patent doctrine is objectively reasonable
131
—then PRE immunizes any 
antitrust challenge to the infringement action when the infringement suit itself is 
objectively well founded. These are essentially the facts of the PRE case itself, except 
that it involved copyright rather than patent law. 
(2) PRE does not explicitly apply to the more usual case where the question in the 
patent infringement suit involves a disputed matter of fact or complex mixed questions 
of law and fact.
132
 This could include issues such as whether the infringement 
defendant's conduct actually constitutes infringement or whether information in the 
infringement plaintiff's possession or infirmities in the patent application process renders 
the patent invalid or unenforceable—for example, where the patentee lied about 
                                            
129
 See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 113 
S. Ct. 1920, 123 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1993), 508 U.S. 49. The case is discussed in greater detail in 1 
Antitrust Law ¶205b. Cf. B.V. Optische Industrie de Oude Delft v. Hologic, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 
162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (fact that patent infringement suit was settled does not establish 
conclusively that it could not be an antitrust violation; to be sure, the cost of settling might be 
less than the cost of litigating, but one must query whether the infringement defendant's 
willingness to settle indicates that the suit must not have been objectively baseless). 
130
 PRE, 508 U.S. at 61 n.6. The Court cited the majority's and Justice Harlan's concurring 
opinion in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-177, 
179-180 (1965), both of which noted that unjustified claims made in patent infringement suits 
typically involve false allegations of fact rather than irrational theories of law. 
131
 E.g., Mitek Surgical Products, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (D. Utah 1998) 
aff'd, 230 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000), where the infringement claim depended on the claim 
construction given to the patent, which is a question of law. 
132
 E.g., Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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disqualifying prior sales.
133
 But if the infringement plaintiff has made an objectively 
reasonable investigation and has an objectively reasonable basis for believing that its 
patent is valid, enforceable, and infringed under the circumstances, then its infringement 
suit enjoys antitrust immunity even if the court should subsequently disagree and find 
the patent invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.
134
 
(3) If the patent infringement claim succeeds, antitrust immunity is automatic,
135
 
subject to one important exception: if it should subsequently be determined that the 
claim's success depended on information that the patentee knew or should have known 
at the time of presenting it to be false, then the suit could still be a “sham” and thus 
satisfy the conduct requirement for a §2 claim. Although some dicta in the PRE decision 
might be read to immunize any successful suit, the facts of that case involved only a 
disputed question of law, and the decision cannot be read to immunize a lawsuit that 
was successful only because of fraudulently made factual misrepresentations in the 
course of litigation.
136
 
(4) In PRE the Supreme Court also said this in dicta: 
                                            
133
 E.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
375 (2007) (applicant lied in application about disqualifying sales made more than one year prior 
to application). 
134
 Note that as many as half of patents, once committed to litigation, are found to be invalid. 
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (finding about 46 precent of litigated patents to be invalid). 
Other studies finding higher percentages are discussed in 3 Antitrust Law ¶705a.  Nevertheless, 
the Patent Act gives an issued patent a presumption of validity in litigation  See 35 U.S.C. §282.  
Further, the Supreme Court has held that this presumption can be defeated only by clear and 
convincing evidence, even if the patentee may have neglected to cite important prior art.  See 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011). 
135
 See FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1995), [FULL CITE], 67 
F.3d at 936. And see Contour Chair Lounge Co. v. True-Fit Chair, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. 
Mo. 1986) (antitrust liability for baseless infringement suit cannot obtain when the patent was 
found to be valid). 
136
 To illustrate, the patentee whose patent was unenforceable because it swore to the PTO 
that there were no disqualifying prior sales when such sales had actually occurred, might succeed 
in a subsequent infringement suit if evidence of the prior sales was not exposed. But if exposed 
later, such evidence might serve both to invalidate the patent and support the antitrust claim. See 
the discussion of Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
See Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 224 Fed. Appx. 675, 2007-1 Trade Cas. ¶75,646 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 16, 2007, unpublished) (success in the underlying patent infringement suit created a 
presumption that the suit was properly brought, which could be rebutted only by a showing of 
fraud or perjury). See also Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 204 F.3d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 2000): 
[T]he existence of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes a finding that an 
antitrust defendant has engaged in sham litigation….Under our decision today, therefore, a 
proper probable cause determination irrefutably demonstrates that an antitrust plaintiff has not 
proved the objective prong of the sham exception and that the defendant is accordingly entitled 
to…immunity. 
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Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court 
examine the litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part 
of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the 
baseless lawsuit conceals “an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor…through the “use [of] the 
governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that 
process—as an anticompetitive weapon.” This two-tiered process 
requires the plaintiff to disprove the challenged lawsuit's legal 
viability before the court will entertain evidence of the suit's 
economic viability. Of course, even a plaintiff who defeats the 
defendant's claim to Noerr immunity by demonstrating both the 
objective and the subjective components of a sham must still prove 
a substantive antitrust violation. Proof of a sham merely deprives 
the defendant of immunity; it does not relieve the plaintiff of the 
obligation to establish all other elements of his claim.
137 
(5)  The fact that the Supreme Court compels an objective test for 
baselessness in PRE is not necessarily inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s 
requirement in Therasense that inequitable conduct requires proof of actual 
intent to deceive.
138
  However, it does suggest that the Therasense 
conclusion is too servere, given the exclusionary power of at least some 
patent and the potential for abuse.  The Therasense court was justifiably 
concerned that inequitable conduct is raised in far too many patent 
infringement cases, but the better remedy for that is to penalize infringement 
defendants for making frivolous inequitable conduct claims, not to permit 
patent applicants to act carelessly or even with gross negligence in preparing 
patent applications. 
This language quoted above from PRE suggests that the §2 claim includes a 
“subjective” as well as an “objective” element. These dicta should not be read to require 
inquiry into the infringement plaintiff's actual state of mind. Here, like anywhere else, 
intent can be inferred from sufficiently unambiguous conduct. Consider the patentee 
who himself made sales prior to the patent application that would have barred 
patentability if disclosed. The Patent Act's on sale bar prevents patenting of a product 
that was sold more than a year prior to the filing of the initial patent application in the 
United States.
139
 The applicant signed a sworn statement to the PTO that no such sales 
had occurred and years later brings an infringement action on this patent. Such a case, 
if the facts are sufficiently unambiguous, would serve to establish both the objective and 
the “subjective” motivation necessary, even though there is no additional evidence of 
subjective intent such as a memorandum between company officials stating “we are 
bringing this lawsuit even though we know that the on sale bar renders this patent 
unenforceable.” 
                                            
137
 Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60  
(1993). 
138
 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287. 
139
 35 U.S.C. §102(b). 
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In Dippin' Dots the Federal Circuit appeared to read the PRE language much more 
literally. The infringement plaintiff's patent was rendered unenforceable by some 800 
retail sales that occurred more than a year before the initial patent application was 
filed.
140
 The patentee neglected to disclose this information in its application, and the 
patentee's declaration contained a sworn statement that no such sales had occurred. 
Public sales made more than one year prior to filing bar patentability under §102(b) of 
the Patent Act, and also serve to make the patent “obvious” under §103.
141
 The court 
found that the information, if disclosed, would almost certainly have barred patentability 
and held the patent invalid.
142
 
The court nevertheless held that the degree of inequitable conduct necessary to 
invalidate the patent was not as great as the degree needed to support an antitrust 
claim.   In this case the only evidence of the patentee's anticompetitive intent was the 
fact that it had made the 800 sales over a one-week period and then later swore to the 
PTO that the sales had not occurred. The patentee subsequently also filed a patent 
infringement suit against those offending one or more of the claims made in the patent. 
The Federal Circuit held that while this omission clearly qualified as inequitable conduct, 
it fell short of fraud in the Walker Process sense, which requires a stronger showing of 
both intent and materiality.
143
 In order to support a Walker Process antitrust case “there 
must be evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the omission.”
144
 The court 
observed: 
It might be argued that because the omitted reference was so 
important to patentability, DDI [the patentee] must have known of 
its importance and must have made a conscious decision not to 
disclose it. That argument has some force, but to take it too far 
would be to allow the high materiality of the omission to be 
balanced against a lesser showing of deceptive intent by the 
patentee. Weighing intent and materiality together is appropriate 
when assessing whether the patentee's prosecution conduct was 
inequitable. However, when Walker Process claimants wield that 
conduct as a “sword” to obtain antitrust damages rather than as a 
mere “shield” against enforcement of the patent, they must prove 
                                            
140
 Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
141
 See 35 U.S.C. §§102(b), 103. 
142
 See 476 F.3d at 1346: 
Absent explanation, the evidence of a knowing failure to disclose sales that bear all the 
earmarks of commercialization reasonably supports an inference that the inventor's attorney 
intended to mislead the PTO. The concealment of sales information can be particularly egregious 
because, unlike the applicant's failure to disclose, for example, a material patent reference, the 
examiner has no way of securing the information on his own. 
143
 Relying on Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068-1069 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
144
 476 F.3d at 1347 (“The difference in breadth between inequitable conduct and Walker 
Process fraud admits the possibility of a close case whose facts reach the level of inequitable 
conduct, but not of fraud before the PTO. This is such a case.”). 
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deceptive intent independently.
145
 
This approach recreates some of the same difficulties of pre-Matsushita antitrust 
litigation under standards that make it difficult to grant summary judgment,
146
 except in 
reverse. It requires extensive discovery through the patentee's documents for evidence 
of anticompetitive “intent” other than that manifested in the patent application itself. 
Further, it makes the infringement defendant's antitrust counterclaim dependent on the 
vagaries of the patentee's document retention policy or other efforts to suppress 
incriminating information, often attending pre-application activities that occurred many 
years prior to the litigation. For example, in Dippin Dots the sales found to invalidate the 
patent occurred in 1987. The subsequent patent infringement suit was filed in April 
2000, some 13 years later.
147
 By that time the evidence of disqualifying sales could very 
well have been suppressed unless it was available from sources other than the 
patentee. 
Further, the improper conduct was not limited to the misrepresentation to the PTO 
about prior sales; it also consisted in the subsequent filing of a patent infringement 
lawsuit, presumably designed to exclude the infringement defendant in the hopes that 
the disqualifying sales would not be discovered. Certainly one who files a patent 
infringement suit with present knowledge that the patent is unenforceable has met §2's 
conduct requirement. 
In any event, the Dippin Dots statement that the degree of inequitable conduct 
necessary to invalidate a patent is not as great as the degree needed to support an 
antitrust claim was very likely overruled by Therasense’s requirement that even 
inequitable conduct involves actual knowledge and intent to deceive.  Once the 
inequitable conduct doctrine is recast this way there seems to be no room for a finding 
of “greater’ inequitable conduct in antitrust cases. 
Patents of questionable validity or enforceability 
As noted above, PRE does not fully resolve the question of how to determine when 
a patent infringement suit is a sham that itself violates §2 of the Sherman Act. Patent 
infringement suits typically concern disputed issues of fact, most often going to patent 
validity, for which the “sham” analysis is different from what it is for questions of law. 
                                            
145
 476 F.3d at 1348 (internal citations omitted). The court added: 
While Walker Process intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case, “[a] 
mere failure to cite a reference to the PTO will not suffice.” This is not to say that an omission 
always reduces to “mere failure to cite.” We acknowledged in Nobelpharma“that omissions, as 
well as misrepresentations, may in limited circumstances support a finding of Walker Process 
fraud…because a fraudulent omission can be just as reprehensible as a fraudulent 
misrepresentation.” We believe, though, that to find a prosecution omission fraudulent there 
must be evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the omission. 
(Citing and quoting Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070-1071). 
146
 See 2 Antitrust Law ¶308. 
147
 See In re Dippin' Dots Patent Litigation, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (docket 
entry). 
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Significantly, a complaint raising nothing more than a disputed question of law can 
frequently be disposed of without any discovery or trial. Disputes raising significant 
disputed fact issues often cannot be.
148
 
The lower courts have wrestled with this problem for some time and have developed 
strict requirements for any infringement defendant claiming that the infringement action 
violated the antitrust laws.
149
 In Handgards the Ninth Circuit observed that an undue 
                                            
148
 See Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales del Centro S.A. de C.E.V., 464 F.3d 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting antitrust counterclaim to patent infringement action based on claim 
that patentee falsely stated that certain of its products were covered by a particular patent claim 
when patentee had consistently maintained that they were covered and no court had adjudicated 
to the contrary; further, its legal position seemed plausible; also, antitrust counterclaimant 
alleged that patentee continued to warn former's customers of infringement even after 
counterclaimant notified patentee that it had changed its process so as to no longer infringe; 
patentee was entitled not to accept this notification at face value without proof); Netflix, Inc. v. 
Blockbuster, Inc., 2006-2 Trade Cas. ¶75,484 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (Blockbuster adequately 
alleged Walker Process violation in claim that Netflix committed fraud on PTO in acquiring 
business method patents and then filed bad faith infringement suit against rival; in particular, 
Neflix failed to reference preexisting patents held by a third party; that Netflix knew of these 
patents at the time it filed its own patent application; and that communication of the existence of 
these patents to examiner would have resulted in non-issuance of Netflix patents; court also 
concludes that Blockbuster adequately pled sham litigation as an “independent” basis for its 
antitrust lawsuit); Synopsys, Inc. v. Magma Design Automation, 2006 WL 1452803, 2006-1 
Trade Cas. ¶75,320 (D. Del. May 25, 2006) (plaintiff adequately pled that defendant used 
fraudulently obtained patents and public accusations of infringement and other disparagement to 
drive plaintiff out of business; rejecting defendant's claim that antitrust injury was not adequately 
pled). 
Cf. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 437 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(defendant pioneer drug manufacturer could have violated antitrust laws by listing patent in the 
government registry known as the “Orange Book” and announcing its own plans to make a 
generic version of its drug, thus ousting the plaintiff, a generic competitor, but then refusing to 
go ahead with the generic version; however, ultimately concluding that statute of limitations 
barred the claim); General Physiotherapy, Inc., v. Sybaritic, Inc., 2006 WL 269991, 2006-1 
Trade Cas. ¶75,121 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 1, 2006) (defendants' multiplication of trademarks and 
possible fraud in obtaining some of them could have violated §2; denying summary judgment); 
Gardner v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 2d 468 (N.D. Miss. 2000) (trademark infringement claim not 
objectively baseless). 
149
 See, e.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007) Honeywell Intl. Inc. 
v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp., 488 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (dismissing antitrust 
counterclaim where patent infringement action not shown to be objectively baseless); Q-Pharma, 
Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (antitrust defendant's patent 
infringement suit was not objectively baseless even though infringement claim failed; 
defendant's interpretation of the patent claim in question was a reasonable one, and defendant 
was not required to give weight to letters from accused infringers asserting the patent's 
invalidity); BioTechnology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 267 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
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(underlying patent infringement suit found not to be baseless; as a result, antitrust counterclaim 
dismissed); Proportion-Air, Inc. v. Buzmatics, Inc., 57 F.3d 1085, 1995-2 Trade Cas. ¶71,144 
(Fed. Cir. unpub.) (same); Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 141 F.3d 
1178 (9th Cir. 1998, unpub.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 930 (1998) (antitrust complaint dismissed 
where infringement suit found not to be objectively baseless); Filmtec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 
F.3d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 814 (1999) (even though patentee lost 
infringement suit, its claim was not objectively baseless); Carroll Touch, [FULL CITE], 15 F.3d 
at 1582-1583 (same). 
See also Abbott Laboratories v. TEVA Pharmaceutical, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 
2006) (rejecting motion to dismiss; pioneer's patent litigation against generics could have been a 
sham); Wellbutrin SR Antitrust Litigation, 2006 WL 616292, 2006-1 Trade Cas. ¶75,158 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 14, 2006) (under facts as alleged in complaint, pioneer's patent infringement lawsuits 
against generic producer based on doctrine of equivalence would have been known to be 
frivolous; thus Walker Process claim survived motion to dismiss); Morton Grove 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2006 WL 850873, 2006-1 Trade Cas. 
¶75,179 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2006) (plaintiff adequately pled Walker Process claim based on 
knowing and willful failures to disclose prior art at time of antitrust defendant's patent 
application, including an allegation that but for the failures to disclose the patent would not have 
issued; also approving “sham” litigation claim); Albert Hazelquist v. Guchi Moochie Tackle Co., 
Inc., 2004 WL 1599378, 2004-2 Trade Cas. 174,498 (W.D. Wash., May 12, 2004) (trade dress; 
patentee originally represented to patent office that fishing tackle device was purely ornamental 
when in fact it had a function; this was not fraud sufficient to make its subsequent infringement 
claim a Walker Process violation); Honeywell Intl., Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 343 F. 
Supp. 2d 272 (D. Del. 2004) (rejecting antitrust counterclaim where underlying patent 
infringement suit was not objectively baseless); Applera Corp. v. MI Research, Inc., 303 F. 
Supp. 2d 130 (D. Conn. 2004) (evidence that patent owner had threatened infringement suits 
against other firms in order to obtain licenses and that its motives may have been anticompetitive 
was irrelevant if its current infringement action was not objectively baseless); Terazosin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (brand-name 
manufacturer's attempts to enforce its pharmaceutical patents were not objectively baseless); 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 90 F. Supp. 2d 540 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding fact 
issue whether infringement plaintiff had obtained patent by fraud; denying summary judgment 
on antitrust counterclaim); Ecrix case, [FULL CITE] (requiring discovery on issue whether 
infringement plaintiff had reasonable basis for concluding that infringement defendant's 
technology actually infringed); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Genpharm, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 367 
(D.N.J. 1999) (question whether patents allegedly infringed by defendant's suit were 
unenforceable and suit brought only to obtain infringement defendant's trade secrets could not be 
resolved on motion to dismiss); Baxa Corp. v. McGaw, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Col. 1998), 
aff'd, 185 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (no antitrust violation where patent was not shown to be 
procured by either fraud or inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office); 
Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 964 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Kan. 1997) (filing of patent 
infringement counterclaims not an antitrust violation where the counterclaims could not be 
characterized as objectively baseless). 
Related decisions include Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929 (6th 
Cir. 1999), rev'd on nonantitrust issue, 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (because trade dress rights can last 
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readiness to hold an infringement suit improper would diminish the protection afforded 
by patent grants, contrary to their purpose.
150
 To avoid that danger, the court presumed 
that patent infringement actions are reasonably brought, and the antitrust plaintiff can 
defeat this presumption only by clear and convincing evidence.
151
 Similarly, the Federal 
Circuit emphasized that every patent enjoys a strong presumption of validity,
152
 and the 
                                                                                                                                            
beyond the expiration of patent rights, bringing of a trade dress infringement suit after patent had 
expired was not a “sham”). Cf. Undersea Breathing Sys., Inc. v. Nitrox Tech., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 
752 (N.D. Ill. 1997), appeal dismissed, 155 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (infringement defendant 
could not show that infringement action constituted patent misuse or antitrust violation where 
there was only weak evidence suggesting that patentee had failed to disclose all prior art at time 
of application; court ultimately found insufficient evidence that patent was invalid but also no 
infringement); Publications Intl. Ltd. v. West Publishing Co., 1994 WL 23008, 1994-1 Trade 
Cas. ¶70,540 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (monopolization possible if market-dominating patent obtained by 
fraud for nonpatentable invention but appearing to have sufficient “colorable validity” to 
intimidate actual or potential rivals; refusal to dismiss complaint even though plaintiff alleged 
relevant market of “electronic storybooks,” within which market there were apparently numerous 
noninfringing products); see also Agere Sys. Guardian Corp. v. Proxim, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 
726 (D. Del. Mar. 6, 2002) (antitrust counterclaimant sufficiently pled that infringement plaintiff 
was attempting to enforce patent obtained by fraud). 
And see Andrx Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting antitrust claim that patent infringement suit was fraudulent because patent was not 
enforceable due to on sale bar, where two other courts had already concluded that the on sale bar 
did not apply so as to defeat the patent); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (Noerr and PRE protected filing of trademark and trade dress infringement 
counterclaims when these were found not to be objectively baseless); Novo Nordisk of N. 
America v. Genentech, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (patentee's infringement claim 
before international agency not objectively baseless simply because the claim was ultimately 
dismissed for discovery-related misconduct; magistrate had found some evidence of 
infringement). 
150
 Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc. (Handgards I), 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 
151
 The antitrust plaintiff later succeeded in doing so. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc. 
(Handgards II), 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985). Because 
proving the patentee's bad faith for this purpose necessarily proved a “sham” exception to 
Noerr's privilege to sue, the court also held that requiring a jury instruction on the Noerr issue 
would be duplicative. Id. at 1295. 
The Federal Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit in Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 
861 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also FMC Corp. v. The Manitowoc Co., 654 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ill.), 
aff'd, 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring clear and convincing evidence); Tennant Co. v. 
Hako Minuteman, 651 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (same). 
152
 As provided by 35 U.S.C. §282 (providing that both patent as a whole and each individual 
claim made in a patent enjoys presumption of validity, even if another claim has proved to be 
invalid; burden of proof on person alleging invalidity).  See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 
131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011) (adhering to rule requiring clear and convincing evidence to defeat the 
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one seeking to show invalidity has the burden of proof.
153
 The court further declared that 
one challenging an infringement action on an invalid patent as an antitrust violation 
must show specific intent, not merely negligence or even recklessness with respect to 
the invalidity of the patent.
154
 That requirement seems consistent with the PRE 
requirement, discussed above, that the inquiry into “sham” consist of two parts. First, 
one must determine on the basis of objective information whether the infringement suit 
was unreasonable under the circumstances. Second, and “[o]nly if challenged litigation 
is objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant's subjective motivation.”
155
 
The infringement plaintiff's subjective knowledge that a patent is invalid or 
unenforceable would make an enforcement suit exclusionary, as would its knowledge 
that the patent is otherwise unenforceable because of the patentee's misuse or some 
other equitable factor. However, the difficulty of knowing when a court will deem a valid 
patent unenforceable means that we can seldom find the infringement suit improper 
merely because a court refuses to enforce a valid patent. Thus the Eighth Circuit found 
no antitrust violation when a firm sued to enforce a patent that was valid but determined 
to be unenforceable because of the patentee's “unfair” conduct.
156
 Similarly, the antitrust 
defendant in Argus had engaged in inequitable conduct before the patent office by 
failing to disclose sales of the patented product that had been made more than one year 
before the application was filed.
157
 The court declined to find an antitrust violation 
without proof of “knowing and willful patent fraud” that is “based on the use of an invalid 
patent to monopolize….”
158
 And the FMC court held that “inequitable conduct” before 
the patent office is not enough, for negligent or even grossly negligent failure to disclose 
a material fact that might have led to nonissuance of a patent showed no more than 
                                                                                                                                            
validity presumption, but permitting infringement defendant to request a jury instruction inviting 
consideration of omitted prior art). 
153
 American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). See also Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 
417 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (mere bringing of a single infringement action on patent subsequently found 
invalid does not establish antitrust violation); Carlisle Corp. v. Hayes, 635 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. 
Cal. 1986). 
154
 Sowa, 725 F.2d at 1368. 
155
 Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920, 1928. 
See Scientific Drilling Intl. v. Gyrodata Corp., 215 F.3d 1351, 1999 WL 674511 (Fed. Cir. 1999, 
unpub.) (since it had not yet been determined whether infringement plaintiff's suit was 
objectively baseless, it was premature to dismiss antitrust counterclaim); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. 
Comfortex Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 145 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (on pretrial motion, separating patent 
infringement trial from antitrust counterclaim trial, because patentee's success on the first would 
make the second unnecessary). Accord Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 191 F.R.D. 611 (D. Colo. 
2000). 
156
 DuPont v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1273-1275 (8th Cir. 1980). 
157
 Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987); accord 
Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
158
 Argus, 812 F.3d at 1385, quoting SSP Agric. Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d 
1096, 1103-1104 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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“inequitable conduct.”
159
 Fraud requires knowledge and specific intent to obtain an 
undeserved patent. 
Clearly, however, if the antitrust defendant knew it was not entitled to relief because 
its patent was not enforceable, then its conduct could be both exclusionary and 
unprotected by either Noerr
160
 or PRE. In sum, obtaining a patent by inequitable 
conduct falling short of fraud is not an antitrust violation, but bringing an infringement 
action with the subjective or readily discoverable knowledge that the patent is 
unenforceable may constitute a violation. 
Finally, the antitrust defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the evidence 
shows that the facts necessary to support the antitrust plaintiff's claim are more likely 
than not to be true.
161
 This means not merely that the evidence must be consistent with 
the defendant's possession of the requisite knowledge or intent, but also that the 
evidence justifies the conclusion that such possession was more probable than not. 
Nonetheless, some courts continue to be quite reluctant to grant summary judgment.
162
 
Patent valid but not infringed 
The same considerations given previously also apply when the patent in question is 
                                            
159
 FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., Inc., 835 F.2d at 1415 & n.9. See also Korody-Colyer 
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. 
Research Medical, 691 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Utah 1988) (antitrust plaintiff must show “intentional 
fraud in the common law sense”: misrepresentation of a material fact going to the validity of the 
patent with knowledge of its falsity and reliance by the Patent Office on this misrepresentation in 
issuing the patent). Cf. Glaverbel Society Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 
1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (defendant did not procure patent fraudulently or even engage in 
inequitable conduct when its initial patent application failed to refer to two similar patents, but 
the initial application was not required to do so; and where the company subsequently narrowed 
the scope of its patent upon patent office's reexamination; none of this came close to proving 
intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence). 
160
 See 1A Antitrust Law ¶203. 
161
 See 2 Antitrust Law ¶308. 
162
 E.g., Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 176 L. 
Ed. 2d 519 (2010) at 965-967 (refusing summary judgment even though there was no evidence 
offered of fraud on the patent office by the antitrust defendant, but merely of some controversy 
as to the state of the prior art). See also ID Security Systems Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint Systems, 
Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2003), amended by 268 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(troublesome dicta that evidence of patentee's previous patent infringement actions were 
admissible on question of anticompetitive intent even though there was no evidence that the 
infringement actions were improper; relying on Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 
425 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1953); ultimately dismissing claim on market 
power grounds); Applera Corp. v. MJ Research, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D. Conn. 2004) 
(evidence that patent owner priced licenses for its two patents in a way that forced licensees to 
take both even if they only wanted one was admissible relevant to antitrust counterclaim to 
infringement action, as well as patent misuse defense). 
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of undisputed validity, but the infringement plaintiff took insufficient steps to ensure that 
the infringement defendant was actually an infringer.
163
 Of course, the patentee may 
have been careless. But the monopolist might pursue a policy of protecting its market by 
launching a lawsuit against every rival product appearing on the scene, without regard 
to actual infringement, and simply to deter small rivals from entering. 
The PRE objective standard asks mainly whether the patentee exercised reasonable 
care in determining the fact of infringement. Although we cannot discuss the many 
possibilities, a few illustrations and principles may be stated. 
When the monopolist is vindicating a product patent, we can at least insist that it 
inspect the allegedly infringing article and draw a reasonable conclusion of infringement 
before filing its infringement suit or taking other actions, such as writing letters to 
customers, that might injure the alleged infringer's market position.
164
 This restriction 
applies regardless of any sincere belief the monopolist might have about the 
impossibility of a noninfringing product in its field.
165
 
The product itself may not reveal the presence or absence of an infringed process 
patent. In that case, the monopolist should be compelled to request a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect the allegedly infringing process before attacking. Once these 
preliminaries have occurred, we hesitate to appraise too precisely the monopolist-
patentee's judgment about infringement—especially in an infringement suit where the 
infringement defendant might want to divert the suit from the question of infringement to 
the plaintiff's reasonableness in suing. The patentee should not be forced to sue at its 
peril. Yet, neither should its discretion be completely immune from review. Accordingly, 
we conclude that a monopolist-patentee's judgment in attacking an infringer may be 
tested for reasonableness in any appropriate suit, but the alleged infringer must 
overcome a presumption of reasonableness in favor of a patentee whose behavior 
appears reasonable on its face. We emphasize that issues concerning the legal 
question of infringement and the facts that constitute it are to be addressed directly 
under the patent laws. 
 
                                            
163
 The question of claim construction is closely related. In general, the scope of the “claim” 
made in the patent application presents a question of law. In such cases the infringement 
defendant may not be disputing the validity of the patent but alleges that it is not an infringer 
because the claim is to be construed more narrowly than the infringement plaintiff alleges. 
164
 The court did so insist in Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952). See also Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 95 F.Supp.2d 1155 (D.Colo. 
2000)  (permitting antitrust plaintiff discovery into factual basis for infringement plaintiff's 
allegation that former's technology infringed the latter's patent). 
165
 Such a rule might be thought futile because antitrust law is not likely to interfere very 
effectively with a patentee's propensity to sue once it goes through the motions of inspecting the 
allegedly infringing article. But even if some patentees sue with undetected bad faith, 
encouraging proper forms of conduct can beneficially influence the substance of behavior. This 
limited intervention, moreover, may threaten an appraisal of the patentee's judgment in suing and 
thereby deter some undesirable conduct. 
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i See, e.g., Johnson v. Con-Vey/Keystone, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Or. 1994) 
(notifying rivals' customers concerning patent infringement suit not protected by Noerr). 
Compare Oetiker v. Jurid Werke GmbH, 671 F.2d 596, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (letter, 
ignored by plaintiff's suppliers, stating without bad faith that patent holder “would be 
forced to vindicate its patent right if no settlement proposal were received” constituted 
“neither a threat nor an enforcement sufficient to trigger the antitrust laws”). 
